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COMMENT
OIG Bulletin Highlights Schizophrenic Attitude in Cost-Saving
Measures: Gainsharing Arrangements-Their History, Use,
and Future
In 1985 the Office of the Inspector General of the Department
of Health and Human Services (OIG) investigated Paracelsus
Healthcare Corporation, a health care chain, to determine the
legality of the gainsharing arrangement1 implemented by Paracelsus.2
Paracelsus implemented the gainsharing arrangement following
Medicare's implementation of diagnostic related groups (DRGs) 3
and the prospective payment system (PPS).4 Under the arrangement,
which was reportedly established to align the physicians' economic
incentives with those of the hospital,' physicians were individually
1. Throughout this Comment the term "gainsharing arrangements" will be used. On
occasion, this Comment also refers to incentive programs in the same context as
gainsharing arrangements. Gainsharing arrangements are a type of incentive program,
and although gainsharing arrangements comprise the overwhelming majority of incentive
programs, the two are not synonymous. An incentive program, in general, is anything that
serves to motivate or induce a certain response. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 912 (Anne H. Soukhanov et al., 3d ed. 1992). Gainsharing
arrangements, in the context of this Comment, refer to programs that serve to align the
economic interests of hospitals and physicians by offering physicians financial incentives
to achieve a specified result. See John R. Washlick, Hospital/Physician Gainsharing
Arrangements: The IRS Giveth and the OIG Taketh Away, HEALTH LAW., Aug. 1999, at
1, 1, 3 (discussing the rationales for gainsharing arrangements and their benefits).
Examples of gainsharing arrangements include bonus arrangements, compensation
arrangements, joint ventures, increased risk sharing, and risk pools. See infra notes 86-129
and accompanying text.
2. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-86-103, MEDICARE:
PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PAYMENTS BY HOSPITALS COULD LEAD TO ABUSE 1, 15 (1986)
(Sup. Docs. No. GA1.13:HRD-86-103) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
3. Diagnostic related groups (DRGs) are comprised of roughly 470 medical
diagnoses for which Medicare has established corresponding set treatment costs. Michael
K. Beard, The Impact of Changes in Health Care Provider Reimbursement Systems on the
Recovery of Damages for Medical Expenses in Personal Injury Suits, 21 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 453,468 (1998).
4. The prospective payment system (PPS) reimburses hospitals a set amount based
on the Medicare beneficiary's DRG. Helena G. Rubinstein, Nonprofit Hospitals and the
Federal Tax Exemption: A Fresh Prescription, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 381,407 (1997).
5. This Comment adopts the traditional Medicare definition of "physician," which
includes doctors of medicine, osteopathy, dental surgery, podiatry, optometry, and
chiropractors who meet certain criteria. 42 C.F.R. § 405.2401 (1999).
Prior to 1984, hospitals were paid the reasonable costs of providing services to
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paid a portion of the difference between the Medicare payment and a
pre-determined percentage of the hospital's charges.6 Paracelsus's
arrangement principally sought to reduce the length of patients' stay
in the hospital in order to maximize hospital profits.
Despite the lack of closure to the OIG's investigation, the
hospital industry views the Parclesus case as the catalyst to
Congress's enactment of the Civil Monetary Penalty (CMP) statute.
8
This statute establishes penalties for health care entities that
"knowingly make a payment, directly or indirectly, to a physician as
an inducement to reduce or limit services" that are provided to
Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries under the direct care of the
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. The Social
Security Act of 1983 established the PPS, under which hospitals are paid a pre-established
fee for services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries based on the patients' DRGs. Social
Security Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601, 97 Stat. 65, 149-63 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). Hospitals seeking to save money by
modifying their practice patterns and reducing patient stays have turned their focus to
physicians who control the level, amount, and duration of inpatient services. Health Care
Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Civil Money Penalties for Hospital Physician Incentive
Plans, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,571, 61,572 (proposed Dec. 1, 1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
1003). Because physicians, whose jobs are fundamentally altruistic, are reimbursed
separately from hospitals for the services they render to Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries, physicians do not always share the hospitals' incentive to reduce the costs
associated with medical care. Robert G. Homchick, OIG Says No to Hospital
Gainsharing, in OIG Issues Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements: What to
Tell Your Clients? 12, 12 (Am. Health Law. Ass'n Telephone Seminar, Aug. 2, 1999) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). Therefore, hospitals turned to incentive-type
arrangements in an attempt to align physicians' interests with their own. See id.; infra
notes 29-75 and accompanying text (explaining Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement
and the rationale for hospital gainsharing arrangements).
6. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 14. The formula for the incentive payments was as
follows:
If the Amount of the Medicare Payment Falls Within the Range of the Following
Percentages of Retail Charges then the Hospital Would Pay the Physician the
Following Percentage of the Amount Within Each Such Range.
75-85% 10%
85-95% 15%
95% and greater 20%
Kathryn A Krecke, Abusing the Patient: Medicare Fraud and Abuse and Hospital-
Physician Incentive Plans, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 279, 285 n.33 (1986) (citing the
incentive agreement of one hospital within the Paracelsus chain). •
7. When a patient's hospital stay is reduced, less fixed fees are generally spent on the
patient, resulting in greater profits for the hospital. See generally Jacqueline Kosecoff et
al., Prospective Payment System and Impairment at Discharge: The "Quicker-and-Sicker"
Story Revisited, 264 JAMA 1980, 1980 (1990) (studying discharge rates after Medicare
switched to the PPS and concluding that patients were discharged earlier following the
change).
8. Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 231, 110 Stat. 1936, 2012-15 (1996) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a (West Supp. 2000)).
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physician.9 It also serves as an example of the noose the PPS and
DRGs have tied around the hospital industry's neck.10
Since the enactment of the Medicare PPS, hospitals have
struggled to align their financial interests with the often conflicting
economic interests of physicians." Although mindful of the
Paracelsus investigation, numerous hospitals implemented or
included gainsharing agreements as part of their future strategic
plans12 because they believed that such arrangements would
effectively align physicians' pecuniary interests with the hospitals'
desire to maximize profits. Yet fears that gainsharing arrangements
could violate the Stark anti-referral laws,3 the CMP statute, and the
9. Social Security Act § 1128A(b)(1)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(b)(1)(A)-(B)
(West Supp. 2000); see also William S. Painter & Charles W. Ferguson, Recent Legislation,
Cases, and Other Developments Affecting Health Care Providers and Integrated Delivery
Systems, WL SE66 ALI-ABA 433 (2000) (noting the mandates and the effects of the CMP
statute).
10. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing the CMP statute); see
also infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (discussing the PPS and DRGs).
Commentators believe that the CMP statute was enacted to address the type of
arrangement used by Paracelsus-individualized to each physician and focused on length
of stay. See Telephone Interview with Marilou King, Partner, McDermott, Will, & Emery
(Nov. 5, 1999). Paracelsus ended its physician incentive program largely as a result of the
passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509,
§ 9313(c)(1)(E), 100 Stat. 2002, 2003, which specifically outlawed payments "directly or
indirectly, to a physician as an inducement to reduce or limit services" for Medicare
patients. Id. The Department of Health and Human Services Regional Inspector General
subsequently ceased his investigation of the Paracelsus plan. Krecke, supra note 6, at 304.
Although there was no OIG or court opinion, the Paracelsus case was pivotal in alerting
the industry to the possible problems and ramifications associated with incentive
programs.
11. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (discussing the alignment of interests
between physicians and hospitals).
12. Hundreds of hospitals have constructed gainsharing programs or are ready to
implement them as soon as they receive guidance and clearance from the OIG and the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)-the division of the Department of
Health and Human Services that administers the Medicare program. Mary-Chris Jaklevic,
Gainsharing Illegal: HHS: Docs Shouldn't be Paid to Limit Care, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, July 12, 1999, at 12, 12. Commentators have also estimated that there are
several dozen programs currently "up and running." Id.
13. The Stark laws prohibit physician referrals to any entity that provides health care
services if the physician (or anyone in the physician's immediate family) has a financial
interest in the entity. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn (West Supp. 2000). Prohibited arrangements
include compensation arrangements providing direct or indirect cash remuneration. Id.;
see also Shari Kleiner et al., Healthcare Fraud, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 773, 779 (1999)
(explaining how various compensation plans may violate the Stark laws); Melvyn B.
Ruskin & Ellen F. Kessler, Health Care Anti-Referral Laws Effective in 1995, N.Y. L J.,
Jan. 5, 1995, at 1, 5 (explaining the Stark laws).
Similarly, the OIG has released Special Fraud Alerts addressing the anti-kickback
and Stark anti-referral laws in relation to hospital incentive arrangements. Publication of
OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,372 (Dec. 19, 1994). According to the OIG,
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anti-kickback laws14 compelled many hospitals to request advisory
opinions.'5 In response to hospital inquiries, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) issued two private letter rulings on gainsharing
arrangements in January 1999.16 Both rulings seemed to authorize
gainsharing-type arrangements.
17
On July 8, 1999, however, the OIG issued a Special Advisory
Bulletin"8 stating that gainsharing arrangements in connection with
suspect incentive arrangements include "[p]ayment of any sort of incentive by the hospital
each time a physician refers a patient to the hospital" and "[p]ayment for services (which
may include consultations at the hospital) which require few, if any, substantive duties by
the physician, or payment for services in excess of the fair market value of services
rendered." Id. at 65,376. In short, if "one of the purposes of the incentive is to influence
the physician's medical decision as to where to refer his or her patients for treatment," the
arrangement violates federal law. Id.
14. See Social Security Act § 1128A(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (West Supp. 2000)
(prohibiting the solicitation or receipt of remuneration in return for referrals of program-
related business).
In 1991, the OIG issued a management advisory report (MAR) intended to alert
the industry to potential violations of the anti-kickback statute by physician compensation
packages. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-09-89-00330, FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
BETWEEN HOSPITALS AND HOSPITAL-BASED PHYSICIANS 1 (1991). The MAR
specifically targeted violations in connection with hospitals paying less than the fair
market value for services rendered by physicians. Id. Richard J. Pollack, Executive Vice
President of the American Hospital Association, criticized the report, stating that the
"underlying premise in the MAR is misguided... [M]ore often than not, hospitals find it
necessary to accommodate physicians' financial requests in order to secure needed
physician services for their patients." Letter from Richard J. Pollack, Executive Vice-
President, American Hospital Association, to Richard P. Kusserow, Inspector General,
United States Government (Sept. 6, 1991), reprinted in OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
supra, at app. B.
15. The Stark and anti-kickback laws are Medicare and Medicaid related statutes. See
infra notes 166-96 and accompanying text. Marilou King and Robert Homchick, two
prominent health care lawyers, both stated that much of the health care industry believed
that gainsharing arrangements were more problematic in relation to the Stark and anti-
kickback laws than the CMP statute. Telephone Interview with Marilou King, supra note
10; Telephone Interview with Robert Homchick, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine L.L.P.
(Nov. 3, 1999). In fact, both stated that it was surprising that the government chose the
CMP statute to address the gainsharing issue. Telephone Interview with Marilou King,
supra note 10; Telephone Interview with Robert Homchick, supra.
16. The specific gainsharing arrangements reviewed by the IRS involved hospital
contracts with cardiologists. Patricia Meador, Healthcare Fraud and Abuse, WL 1175
PLI/Corp. 21, 67 (2000). The contracts included a "cardiovascular cost reduction/quality
improvement program." Id. Ultimately, the IRS concluded that these arrangements did
not violate private inurement rules because any payment in the arrangement required the
objective improvement of cardiovascular care and the provision of more cost-effective
health care. Id.
17. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, IRS Ruling OK Doc Gain-Sharing, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Apr. 5, 1999 at 12, 12.
18. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) established the OIG in
1976. Publication of the OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements
and CMPs for Hospital Payments to Physicians to Reduce or Limit Services to
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the Medicare PPS are impermissible. 19 The Advisory Bulletin
primarily focused on sections 1128A(b)(1) and (2) of the Social
Security Act (the "Act"),20 which outline the regulation of hospital-
sponsored physician incentive plans.2 1 The regulations, codified in
the CM? statute, prohibit any hospital from knowingly making
payments to physicians as inducements to limit or reduce services to
Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries directly under a physician's
care.' Interpreting the CMP statute broadly, the OIG unequivocally
stated that gainsharing arrangements, in which physicians receive a
Beneficiaries, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,985, 37,985 (July 14, 1999) [hereinafter Special Advisory
Bulletin]. Congress created the OIG to identify and reduce waste, fraud, and abuse
throughout HHS programs and to establish and perpetuate efficiency in existing programs.
Id. To that end, Congress granted the OIG the power to conduct audits, investigations,
and inspections. Id. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.,
29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.), authorizes the OIG to offer advisory bulletins to provide direction
to health care and related industries, to prevent fraud and abuse, and to maintain the
highest levels of ethical and lawful conduct. Id. The bulletins inform the health care
industry of practices and arrangements that may constitute fraud and abuse in Medicare
and Medicaid programs and therefore are subject to enforcement by the OIG. Id.; Press
Release, Department of Health and Human Services, Inspector General Issues Special
Advisory Bulletin on Hospital-Physician "Gainsharing" (July 8, 1999), at
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/other/gainnews.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
[hereinafter OIG Issues Bulletin].
19. Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at 37,985; OIG Issues Bulletin, supra
note 18.
20. Social Security Act § 1128A(b)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(b)(1)-(2) (West
Supp. 2000). Section 1128A(b) of the Social Security Act states:
(1) If a hospital or critical access hospital knowingly makes a payment, directly
or indirectly, to a physician as an inducement to reduce or limit services provided
with respect to individuals who-
(A) are entitled to benefits under part A or part B of subchapter XVIII of
this chapter or to medical assistance under a State plan approved under
subchapter XIX of this chapter, and
(B) are under the direct care of the physician, the hospital or a critical access
hospital shall be subject, in addition to any other penalties that may be
prescribed by law, to a civil money penalty of not more than $2,000 for each
such individual with respect to whom the payment is made.
(2) Any physician who knowingly accepts receipt of a payment described in
paragraph (1) shall be subject, in addition to any other penalties that may be
prescribed by law, to a civil money penalty of not more than $2,000 for each
individual described in such paragraph with respect to whom the payment is
made.
Id.
21. Homchick, supra note 5, at 12.
22. Social Security Act § 1128A(b)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(b)(1)-(2) (West
Supp. 2000). Because Medicare and Medicaid are federal programs, those institutions
receiving reimbursement dollars from Medicare and Medicaid programs must adhere to
the relevant federal regulations. See generally Meador, supra note 16, at 60-61, 65-67, 69
& 71 (explaining federal regulations pertaining to Medicare and Medicaid).
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share of hospital savings attributable to physicians' cost control
efforts in connection with Medicare and Medicaid patients, violate
the CMP statute and thus are prohibited.'
The OIG's conclusion that gainsharing arrangements are subject
to the CMP statute serves as a troubling illustration of the
government placing hospitals in an economic straitjacket.24 In the
face of mounting pressure on hospitals to contain costs-in a business
where the physician controls the cost incurring items2--the
prohibition of gainsharing arrangements presents yet another
obstacle to providing cost-effective, high-quality health care.
23. Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at 37,985; see also Telephone Interview
with Robert Homchick, supra note 15 (noting that the OIG seized on the CMPs as the
"silver bullet" to kill gainsharing programs even though the Stark and anti-kickback laws
impose more significant restrictions).
24. The government has applied enforcement measures, including mandatory
utilization of peer reviews, to gainsharing arrangements. See Peer Review Improvement
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 141-143, 96 Stat. 324, 381-88 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Peer Review Improvement Act requires peer review
organizations (PROs) to emphasize monitoring and detecting quality of care problems
created by the Medicare PPS. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3 (1994); see also GAO REPORT, supra
note 2, at 10 (seeking to ensure that diagnosis and requested treatments correspond with
existing protocols, thereby ensuring quality care). At the same time, the Department of
Health and Human Services asked that PROs refer cases that might be subject to
sanctions due to quality of care violations in connection with the PPS. GAO REPORT,
supra note 2, at 10. PROs essentially have three objectives: (1) "to determine if services
are reasonable and medically necessary," (2) "to assure services are of acceptable quality,"
and (3) "to make sure Medicare beneficiaries [are] more economically treated on an
outpatient basis or in a more economical inpatient health care facility [and] are not treated
as hospital inpatients." JOSEPH A. SNOE, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY
SYSTEMS 404 (1998). PROs are specifically required to focus their efforts on premature
discharges and unnecessary hospital admissions. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(a)(1)(F) (West
Supp. 2000). PROs also deny Medicare payments for unnecessary admissions and are
required to report any physician or hospital suspected of abusing the system.
Although it was hoped that PROs would help reduce the number of inappropriate
discharges and re-admittances, the OIG has implied that PROs have failed to prevent
many of the abuses. A study by the OIG's Office of Analysis and Inspections stated, "[i]t
appears that many PROs have not effectively used the authorities or the processes
available to address instances of poor quality care associated with premature discharges."
OFFICE OF ANALYSIS & INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INSPECTION OF
INAPPROPRIATE DISCHARGES AND TRANSFERS, reprinted in Out "Sooner and Sicker":
Myth or Medicare Crises?: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong.,
10, 12 (1986) (Sup. Docs. No. Y4.Ag 4/2:C86/17).
25. Under Medicare and Medicaid, physicians are reimbursed on a fee-for-service
basis in contrast to the hospital's pre-determined lump sum payment. See infra notes 44-
48 and accompanying text; see also David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do
Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 158 (1996) (explaining
that "[tihe more services that are provided, the greater the physician's income").
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This Comment first describes the Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement programs. 6 The Comment then defines gainsharing,
explains its rationale, explores the various types of gainsharing
arrangements, and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of
gainsharing arrangements.27 Next, the Comment examines the
applicable regulatory issues and laws facing gainsharing
arrangements with a special emphasis on the recent OIG Advisory
Bulletin and the CMP statute.28 Finally, this Comment discusses
options for what can and likely will be done about gainsharing
arrangements between hospitals and physicians 9
I. MEDICARE AND MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT
Medicare and Medicaid are federal health care insurance
programs." Under the Medicaid program, the federal government
provides individual states with funds for health care services and
equipment provided to low-income individuals.3  Under the
Medicare program, the federal government directly reimburses
designated health care providers for services and equipment provided
primarily to the elderly and disabled.32
Prior to 1984, Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement was based
on a fee-for-service schedule-payments were based on the
reasonable costs of providing services to Medicare and Medicaid
recipients.3 Under this system, the government reimbursed hospitals
for each service rendered to Medicare patients34 The greater the
number of services rendered to Medicare patients, the more money
the hospital received.35 This created the incentive for hospitals to
encourage physicians to "admit more Medicare patients, leave them
in the hospital longer, and use more services while [the Medicare
beneficiaries were] there.
'36
26. See infra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 51-152 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 153-242 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 243-305 and accompanying text.
30. See Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. 1, 79 Stat. 290
(1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. & 45 U.S.C.).
31. See id.
32. See id.; see also Kleiner et al., supra note 13, at 775 (providing an overview of the
federal Medicare and Medicaid programs).
33. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id. at 9.
36. See id.; see also Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 158 (noting that the system served
physicians' personal interests by encouraging more services for greater fees).
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Congress's concern that the fee-for-service reimbursement
system discouraged hospitals from providing efficient and economical
health care prompted the Medicare Prospective Payment System
(PPS).37 In 1983, Congress introduced the PPS as the hospital
reimbursement method for inpatient services provided under
Medicare and Medicaid s.3  To be reimbursed under the PPS, hospitals
must adhere to certain protocols for admittance and treatment.
39
Upon arrival or admittance to the hospital, the patient is diagnosed
and a treatment plan is constructed.4" The diagnosis is then matched
to one of 492 established diagnosis-related groups (DRGs).41 The
hospital is reimbursed prospectively based on the established cost of
treating the diagnosed DRG-the hospital receives a pre-determined
sum regardless of the number and types of services rendered or the
length of the patient's stay.42 Recognizing that some patients could
be treated at a cost less than the predetermined DRG rate, Congress
hoped to provide hospital management with an incentive to control
costs43-hospitals that successfully treat patients for less than
Medicare's pre-set cost pocket the difference and realize a profit.44
37. See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Civil Money Penalties for Hospital
Physician Incentive Plans, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,571, 61,572 (proposed Dec. 1, 1994) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1003) (crediting the reimbursement system's inherent incentive to
admit higher numbers of Medicare recipients for increased in-patient stays and to provide
more services while the Medicare beneficiary was in the hospital as the impetus for the
PPS); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
EVALUATING THE IMPACTS OF MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT OF POST-HOSPITAL
LONG-TERM-CARE SERVICES: PRELIMINARY REPORT (1985), reprinted in Sustaining
Quality Health Care Under Cost Containment: Joint Hearing Before the House Select
Comm. on Aging and the Task Force on the Rural Elderly of the House Select Comm. on
Aging, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 102, 102 (1985) (Sup. Docs. No. Y4.Ag 4/2:H34/32)
(stating that the purpose of the PPS was to help control the burgeoning health care costs);
Theodore N. McDowell, Comment, The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse
Amendments: Their Impact on the Present Health Care System, 36 EMORY L.J. 691, 703-
05 (1987) ("The purpose of the [PPS was] to provide incentives for hospitals to contain
costs.").
38. Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Civil Money Penalties for Hospital




42. Id. The dollar value assigned to the DRG varies between hospitals as the HCFA
takes into account such factors as location and income levels. See Prospective Payment
Systems for Inpatient Hospital Services, 42 C.F.R. § 412.63 (1999).
43. Eleanor D. Kinney, Making Hard Choices Under the Medicare Prospective
Payment System: One Administrative Model for Allocating Medical Resources Under a
Government Health Insurance Program, 19 IND. L. REV. 1151, 1172 (1986) (explaining the
rationale for implementing the PPS).
44. See id. Section 1886 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(i)-
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To realize profits, however, hospitals must contend with the fact
that physicians are not reimbursed in the same manner.' Under
Medicare Part B,46 physicians are compensated separately for their
services.47 Consequently, physicians do not inherently share the
hospitals' incentive to curtail costs or reduce the number of services
provided.48  Because physicians control the number and types of
services rendered to individuals,49 hospitals have attempted to devise
ways to encourage physicians to recognize the benefits of more
efficient care.50 The implementation of gainsharing arrangements
represents one such attempt.
(ii) (West Supp. 2000), provides for additional reimbursement for those patients whose
length of stay exceeds the calculated mean length-of-stay for all patients with a particular
diagnosis, by a specified number of days or by a fixed number of standard deviations,
whichever is less. Id. Further, additional reimbursement is possible if the Medicare
charges surpass the DRG reimbursement by a fixed dollar amount or by a fixed multiple
of the PPS rate, whichever is greater. Id. This rate is to be determined by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services. 42 C.F.R. § 412.80(a) (1999).
45. See Krecke, supra note 6, at 286.
46. Medicare is organized into two parts, Part A and Part B. See generally SNOE,
supra note 24, at 593-96 (explaining the structure of the Medicare program). Part A is
financed through payroll deductions during the beneficiaries' working years and "covers
hospitals, skilled nursing, home health care, and hospice care." Id. at 593. Medicare Part
B covers physician services and many outpatient services. It is a voluntary program;
individuals must enroll and pay a monthly premium to be beneficiaries. Id. The
premiums are used to cover costs not covered from the general fund. Id.
47. See e.g., Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Benefits, 42 C.F.R. § 410.20
(1999).
48. Physicians are individually reimbursed by the HCFA based on the services they
render to Medicare beneficiaries. The reimbursement amount is determined by a formula,
which takes the region of the country, the type of patient, and the service rendered into
account. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 410, 411, 414, 415 & 485 (1999). Essentially, Medicare
reimburses physicians an amount it considers appropriate compensation for the services
provided. See Krecke, supra note 6, at 284.
49. Krecke, supra note 6, at 283 n.26 ("[E]fficient hospital operation requires close
cooperation between hospital administrators and physician staff .... [I]t is the physician
who makes most of the decisions on patient care. A hospital will not be able to live within
Medicare's prospective payment unless its physicians are willing to economize." (quoting
R. Rubin, in DRG's-What's Next? Two Views, 1, 7 (1984) (remarks at seminar sponsored
by the Mount Sinai School of Medicine, Department of Health Care Management) (on file
with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform))).
50. Richard X. Fischer, Gainsharing and the Law: Key Legal Issues, in OIG Issues
Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements: What to Tell Your Clients? 1, 2 (Am.
Health Law. Ass'n Telephone Seminar, Aug. 2, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). Because the PPS forces hospitals to become more cost-efficient to achieve
greater cost effectiveness, "hospital management must necessarily attempt to modify
physician practice patterns." McDowell, supra note 37, at 736.
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II. GAINSHARING
The term gainsharing encompasses an assortment of different
compensation arrangements used to align the economic interests of
an employer and an employee. 1  In the health care context,
gainsharing arrangements are used to align the economic interests of
hospitals and physicians. Gainsharing encourages "cost effective
care" 2 by providing "payments to physicians of 'a portion of the
hospital's cost-savings in exchange for identifying and implementing
cost-saving strategies.' "53 The majority of gainsharing arrangements
target groups of physicians and specific hospital departments or
medical service lines. 4 Departments with the highest patient volume
and the greatest number of procedures are prime targets for
gainsharing arrangements because modification of physician behavior
in these departments presents the greatest possibility of improving
the hospital's bottom line.
55
A. The Cost-Containment Rationale for Gainsharing
The last two decades have produced enormous increases in
health care costs, 56 which some largely attribute to the "perverse
financial incentives created by the structure" of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs. 7 In 1983, health care expenditures totaled
$355.3 billion in the United States.5 In 1990, these costs totaled
51. Gainsharing is not unique to the health care industry; it has been used throughout
the business community. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory
Management: An Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 988 (1998)
(explaining gainsharing as an attempt to reward employees for assisting a business in
meeting its goals).
52. Washlick, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that the general methods used to share in
cost-savings are percentage payments, hourly fees, fixed fees, and combinations of the
three).
53. Align Docs, Hospitals' Money Incentives, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Aug. 9, 1999,
at 50,50 (quoting the OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on gainsharing arrangements).
54. Washlick, supra note 1, at 3.
55. Id. It is commonly accepted in the health care industry that modifying physicians'
financial incentives guarantees "easy savings." See Align Does' Hospitals' Money
Incentives, supra note 53, at 50. Gainsharing programs, however, are not limited to
providers acting as clinicians. They are used with all levels of staff to improve overall
quality of care, to reduce costs, and to achieve optimal operational efficiencies. See
Washlick, supra note 1, at 3.
56. See Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 155 (detailing the recent rise in health care
costs).
57. McDowell, supra note 37, at 699.
58. Health Care Financing Administration Office of the Actuary, National Health
Care Expenditures 1965-2008, at http:llwww.hcfa.gov/stats/NHE-Proj (last modified July
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$699.4 billion, and in 1997, they totaled $1092.4 billion. 9 Faced with
the mounting costs of health care, the public and the government
have increasingly pressured health care providers to contain costs.
With almost forty-seven percent of health care expenditures funded
by public sources, 60 the pressure to contain costs is not likely to
subside.
Because the majority of the public health care expenditures are
serviced under Medicare and Medicaid, cost-containment efforts
have focused these programs.61  Taking medical resources into
account when determining physician payment 62  and the
implementation of Medicare DRGs, serve as two examples of the
government's increased effort to curtail public health care costs. The
Balanced Budget Amendment of 199763 provides yet another. When
originally enacted, the amendment was estimated to reduce hospital
payments by $155 billion over a five-year period.' The American
Hospital Association subsequently concluded that the amendment
would actually result in a $226 billion reduction in payments to
hospitals.65
These cost-containment efforts, coupled with increased patient
demand for services and technology,6 6 cut at hospitals' bottom lines.67
Hospital operating margins dropped forty-five percent during the
14, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
59. Id. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, medical inflation has outpaced
overall inflation for nine of the last ten years. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Medical Inflation up in 1999, at http://stats.bls.gov./opub/ted2000/Jun
/wk4/art01.htm (last updated June 30,2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
60. See By the Numbers, Medicare and Medicaid, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 19,
1999, at 30,30 [hereinafter By the Numbers].
61. See id.; see also McDowell, supra note 37, at 691 (stating that the introduction of
Medicare and Medicaid marked the beginning of a national health care policy that
emphasizes cost containment).
62. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-4 (West Supp. 2000). See generally BARRY R. FURROW
ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 11-20 (2d ed. 2000) (explaining Medicare payment
methodologies). Under the Resource Based Relative Value Scale, physician
reimbursement is a function of the service rendered, the physician's locale, and the
population served. See SNOE, supra note 24, at 623.
63. Balanced Budget Amendment of 1997, Pub. L. No 105-33, 111 Stat. 251
(instituting reductions in Medicare reimbursement).
64. Barbara Kirchheimer, The Other Shoe Drops, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 12,
1999, at 6, 6 (citing an estimate from the Congressional Budget Office).
65. Id.
66. Bryan A. Liang, Patient Injury Incentives in Law, 17 YALE POL'Y REv. 1, 3
(1998).
67. See Stephen G. Reed, Monitoring Profits Hospital Officials Say the Industry's
Prognosis is Dire, and They're Keeping a Nervous Eye on the Bottom Line. But is that
Bottom Line Really Suffering?, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Oct. 25, 1999, at 12.
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fourth quarter of 1998.68 Results from the first quarter of 1999
evidence a further decline in profitability.69 A 1999 Ernst & Young
survey estimated that the changes in Medicare spending will result in
a reduction in hospital Medicare margins from 4.3% in 1997 to 0.1%
in 1999.70 These changes will reduce total hospital margins from
6.9% in 1998 to 3.6% in 2002.71  Hospital outpatient margins will
become even more unprofitable, falling from -17.0% in 1998 to
-28.8% in 2002; rural hospital margins are expected to fall from 4.2%
in 1998 to -5.6% in 2002.72 In short, the "nation's hospital industry is
ailing. ' 73
To combat the net effect of increased expenses and reduced
payments, hospitals have attempted to implement arrangements that
marginally reduce beneficial services and overall costs to the hospital,
improve the quality of patient care, and secure the allegiance of
referring physicians.74  These remedies include reductions in
institutional waste and increased efficiency of administrative services,
including the streamlining of processes and the restructuring of
practice procedures.75 These administrative remedies, however, have
brought limited relief.76 One reason for the limited success of these
cost-saving measures is that physicians largely control the costs and
spending of the hospital.77 Physicians order the treatments, write the
prescriptions, and control the overwhelming majority of the cost
68. See J. Duncan Moore Jr., Chasm Grows Between Rich and Poor, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, June 7, 1999, at 34, 34 (citing HBS International, a health care outcomes
management company).
69. See id.
70. Robert Laszewski, Trends in Healthcare Financing Market, at
http://www.dartmouth.edu/-hist6/section9/week6/clinks.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2000)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Reed, supra note 67.
74. See Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 155-57; see also Washlick, supra note 1, at 1
(discussing the importance of physician referrals and noting that a hospital would have
very few patients without physicians to refer and admit them).
75. See Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 156-57; Reed, supra note 67. Hospitals have
achieved savings through mergers, cost-cutting measures, over-hauling support services,
and joining with other institutions for such things as laundry services and purchasing. See
generally Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 156-57 (noting the many ways in which hospitals
have attempted to achieve greater efficiency and reduce costs over the past decade).
Nonetheless, there are still too many empty hospital beds; consequently, hospitals are
losing money. See id. Other programs utilized to contain costs, including education, peer
education, and restriction of staff privileges, have also been used in attempts to develop
cost-conscious behavior on the part of physicians. McDowell, supra note 37, at 711.
76. See Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 156.
77. McDowell, supra note 37, at 711.
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incurring items.78 Without a "financial framework that aligns the
economic incentives of physicians and hospitals, making them
partners in solving the problem," neither the modification of
physicians' financial incentives nor operational savings achieved
through active collaboration of the medical staff can be attained.79
Accordingly, the number and types of physician gainsharing plans
used by hospitals have increased."
The imbalance in incentives that resulted from the need for and
proliferation of gainsharing programs was an unintended, though
foreseeable, result of the PPS.81 Those involved in the construction
and development of the Medicare PPS readily admitted that, absent
an alignment of hospital and physician economic incentives, there
would be "major structural dysfunction, which would forever
compromise the PPS." 8 The reimbursement scheme established by
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) presented an
"extraordinary anomaly"-physicians controlled hospital costs but
were reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis, while hospitals controlled
only a small minority of the costs but were reimbursed based on the
physicians' diagnosis rather than services rendered. 3 Hospitals soon
78. See Telephone Interview with Robert Homchick, supra note 15 (explaining that
gainsharing is an effective method of making doctors consider basic things, such as
prescribing generic products or medications in place of more expensive brand items).
Absent an incentive to be cost-conscious, physicians are unlikely to cut costs on their own
initiative. See id.; see also Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Civil Monetary
Penalties for Hospital Physician Incentive Plans, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,571, 61,572 (proposed
Dec. 1, 1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1003) (recognizing physicians' ability and
authority to control costs); JEFF CHARLES GOLDSMITH, CAN HOSPnTALS SURVIVE? 161-
62 (1981) (stating that conflicts with medical staff are particularly dangerous for hospitals
because physicians control hospital utilization); McDowell, supra note 37, at 711 (noting
that physicians control sixty to eighty percent of hospital costs).
79. Align Docs, Hospitals' Money Incentives, supra note 53, at 50.
80. See generally Danielle A. Dolenc & Charles J. Dougherty, DRGs: The
Counterrevolution in Financing Health Care, HASTINGS CTR. REP., June 1985, at 1, 24-25
(noting that the PPS was the impetus for hospitals to start offering financial rewards to
those physicians who save money on Medicare patients); David M. Frankford, Managing
Medical Clinicians' Work Through Use of Financial Incentives, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
71, 71 (1994) (noting the common use of financial incentives in plans for health care
reform); Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to
Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 483 (1988) (stating that the "most
effective motivational force is likely to be financial incentive").
81. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
82. Align Docs" Hospitals' Money Incentives, supra note 53, at 50 (quoting individuals
involved in developing the prototype for the Medicare PPS).
83. Hall, supra note 80, at 434. More specifically, doctors determine where, when,
how long, and how intensively the treatment will be administered. Id. Because physicians
also order lab tests, x-rays, pharmaceuticals, and surgery, they control short-term hospital
costs and "long-term demand for capital resources and insurance coverage." Id. Most
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realized that under the PPS, the shorter a patient's stay, the greater
the number of admits, and the fewer services provided, the greater
the hospital's profit." Because physicians control the treatment and
diagnosis of patients, hospitals realized the advantage of aligning the
physicians' pecuniary interests with the economic goals of the
hospital through gainsharing arrangements.'
B. Types of Gainsharing Arrangements
Gainsharing arrangements are typically several hundred pages
long and are written after countless hours of meetings with
consultants, physicians, and administrators. 6 Most arrangements
have quality assurance guidelines that serve as the trigger for
payment.' In other words, the physician must meet the quality of
care standard before being eligible for payment.8 Many hospitals use
patient satisfaction surveys to assess the quality of a physician's
care.89  The physicians or departments must achieve certain
cumulative scores before they are eligible for compensation from the
gainsharing program 0 Arrangements generally cover all of the
physicians in the department, or on the active medical staff, and
thereby avoid the specter of the Paracelsus investigation of
individually paid physicians.91 Most gainsharing programs provide
strong incentives to physicians to utilize fewer high cost items and to
estimates put physician control of health care expenditures at seventy to ninety percent.
Id.
84. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
85. See Hall, supra note 80, at 434. Salary and capitated service payments both
control the costs of hospitals and present no incentive for physicians to over-prescribe
services. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 158-59 (noting the alternatives to the
fee-for-service method of reimbursement). Conversely, they present no incentive for the
physicians not to over-prescribe. See Hall, supra note 80, at 434. Further, neither salary
nor capitation has been viewed favorably within the medically community. See generally
Victor R. Fuchs, No Pain, No Gain: Perspectives on Cost Containment, 269 JAMA 631,
631-32 (1993) (explaining the relatively small value in utilizing either salary or capitation
as a cost containment measure).





91. Id; see also supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (discussing the Paracelsus
arrangement). By constructing the gainsharing arrangement to include all of the
physicians in a given department or on the medical staff, hospitals also believed they were
eliminating many of the abuses that the government and regulatory bodies were concerned
with regarding gainsharing arrangements and Medicare beneficiaries. Telephone
Interview with Marilou King, supra note 10.
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use discounted or generic products or drugs.92 Although each facility
constructs its own specially tailored gainsharing arrangement,
common components and arrangements include bonuses, structured
compensation arrangements, joint ventures, increased risk sharing,
and risk pools.93
In a typical bonus arrangement, a hospital reserves a set amount
of money to pay for designated types of services.94 At the conclusion
of a designated period of time, generally a month or a year, the
hospital pays any surplus from the fund to the physicians. 5 The
intended goal of bonus arrangements is for physicians to recognize
that providing fewer services leaves more money in the fund to
share.96
In contrast to bonuses, some gainsharing arrangements are
designed as part of the physician's compensation package. 7
Compensation arrangements differ from bonuses in that the
arrangement forms the basis of the physician's salary.9 These
arrangements are often based on a percentage of gross charges, a
percentage of net or adjusted charges, or a percentage of net
collection." These financials figure into a specially designed
formula;01°  the product or end result is the physician's
92. See Telephone Interview with Robert Homchick, supra note 15. Physicians also
often receive financial rewards for reducing a patient's stay and for decreasing the number
of services provided. See id.
93. See infra notes 94-152 and accompanying text (explaining the various types of
arrangements and their strengths and weaknesses).
94. For a summation and exploration of differing types of physician compensation
arrangements, see James F. Owens & Michael Wilson, Physician Compensation-Aligning
Incentives 1-4 (Am. Health Law. Ass'n Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., July 1998)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
95. See generally Alexander M. Capron, Containing Healthcare Costs: Ethical and
Legal Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 708, 725 (1986) (explaining that physicians in bonus arrangements with HMOs or
joint ventures with hospitals may receive surplus payments when "cost-effective" care is
rendered); E. Haavi Morreim, The MD & the DRG, HASTINGS CTR. REP., June 1985, at
30, 34-35 (noting ways in which physicians can be compensated, including the use of
bonus-type arrangements).
96. See Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 160.
97. Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 NEw ENG. J. MED. 604, 605
(1995).
98. Id. (discussing financial incentives and explaining that increases and decreases in a
physician's compensation are dependent on the "cost implications of his or her clinical
choices or the organization's profitability"); cf. Owens & Wilson, supra note 94, at 2
(explaining the role of structured compensation arrangements in maximizing profitability).
99. See Owens & Wilson, supra note 94, at 2. (noting that percentage of net or
adjusted charges and percentage of net collections are preferable over percentage of net
collections because they more realistically measure financial performance).
100. See id.
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compensation. 1 1 Some of the more popular types of compensation
arrangements evaluate each physician's hospital charges for
Medicare patients and compare this number, on a monthly basis, to
the Medicare prospective payments received by the hospital for those
same patients.' ° The physician is then entitled to a set percentage of
the amount of Medicare payments in excess of the costs attributable
to those patients.10 3
By basing physician compensation on a formula encompassing
charges and collections, the hospital encourages efficiency and
provides the physician with incentives to perform only those services
that can be charged to and reimbursed by the government.? 4 By
providing mostly reimbursable services, physicians increase the
hospital's rate of return.0 5 The more money the hospital takes in, the
greater the physicians' personal income.
0 6
A third type of gainsharing arrangement is the Medical Staff
Hospital Joint Venture (MSHJV).' 07 Under this type of
arrangement, the gainsharing program is established as its own
separate entity-a "DRG Venture"'l 8 -controlled and operated by
the MSHJV, which is jointly owned by the hospital and participating
medical staff.1 9 If the costs associated with the care of Medicare
beneficiaries are below a targeted amount, the hospital allocates
money for physician incentive payments according to the terms of a
contract signed by the hospital and the DRG Venture."' The
contract sets standard unit costs for each hospital service and thereby
accounts for costs controlled by physicians and costs controlled by
the hospital."'
The contract also establishes a target discharge rate for each
Medicare beneficiary based on the corresponding DRG; the target
rate is generally below the Medicare reimbursement rate.
2





105. See generally id. at 1-4 (explaining the intricacies of differing arrangements).
106. See id.
107. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, 16-18.
108. Id. at 16.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 17.
112. Id.
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rates, both individually and collectively. 113 The average costs of all
admitted Medicare beneficiaries-of both the participating and
nonparticipating physicians-must be at or below the established
target amounts before incentive payments are disbursed."' Although
the payment is predicated on the collective activities of all the
physicians, the payments themselves are distributed only to those
physicians who saved costs and are based on the amount the
physician was personally able to save." 5
Physician responsibility for saving costs is even more acute in
gainsharing arrangements specifically designed to increase risk
sharing. Under an increased risk sharing arrangement, the hospital
contracts with or establishes a separate agency to assume the
financial risks associated with patient care."6 Typically, a group of
physicians will enter into a contract with the hospital allocating the
financial risk associated with the costs of medical care and
hospitalization for a given group of individuals."7 Through these
types of arrangements, the hospital, primarily responsible for the care
of a Medicare beneficiary, contracts away some of its responsibility to
the physician or another outside entity."8 This type of arrangement
is more common in joint ventures, physician-owned hospitals, and
risk pools,119 and is usually connected with a managed care plan and
groups of primary care physicians.12 The contract between the
entities can take the form of a global capitalization contract involving
a mutual Physician Hospital Organization (PHO)121 or one under




116. See id. at 16-18.
117. See Jacob S. Hacker & Theodore R. Marmor, The Misleading Language of
Managed Care, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1033, 1040-42 (1999).
118. See generally William T. Lifland, Monopolies and Joint Ventures, in 1 41ST
ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE 153 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course, Handbook
Series No. B1180, 2000) (explaining the various types of PHO arrangements and how
entities contract to shift risk and responsibility).
119. See id. at 252-54; see also Robert J. Herrington, Note, Herdrich v. Pegram.
ERISA Fiduciary Duty Liability and Physician Incentives to Deny Care, 71 U. COLO. L.
REV. 715,718-19 (2000) (explaining capitation and risk sharing).
120. See Lifland, supra note 118, at 270-77 (explaining risk sharing arrangements
between managed care entities and joint ventures).
121. A Physician Hospital Organization (PHO) is a form of managed care. A PHO is
comprised of a hospital and its affiliated physicians and offers centralized management in
a less integrated structure than a typical HMO. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 62, § 5-
49(b).
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the managed care plan for the individual services they provide."
Because the separate entity is run (and sometimes owned) by the
providers themselves and because the providers have contracted to
assume more of the risk, there is a strong incentive to provide care in
the most efficient and cost-effective manner in order to increase
profits.123
A fifth type of gainsharing arrangement, risk pools, has also
been employed by some hospitals. 2 4  In a typical risk pool
arrangement, part of the physicians' incomes are withheld and pooled
in a fund," which is then used to pay the costs of medical services for
which the hospital is not reimbursed. 2 6 At the end of some specified
time period, the physicians divide the pool or share in the loss.27 The
participating physicians' share may be based on such factors as
utilization, or use of services, and cost. 28 Currently, there are risk
pools made up solely of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.
12 9
C. The Weaknesses of Gainsharing Arrangements: Incentives Not to
Treat or Not to Treat Well
Although gainsharing arrangements are a generally effective
means of providing cost-efficient health care, a 1986 report on
hospital-physician incentive plans by the General Accounting Office
noted the most troublesome element of such arrangements: the
incentive for physicians not to see, admit, or treat Medicare
beneficiaries. 30 The report also identified the likelihood of problems
122. See Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the
Quality of Medical Care, 26 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 10-14 (2000) (discussing managed care,
capitation, and physician-hospital organizations).
123. See id.
124. See Owens & Wilson, supra note 94, at 1-2.
125. See Tom J. Manos, Comment, Take Half an Aspirin and Call Your HMO in the
Morning-Medical Malpractice in Managed Care: Are HMOs Practicing Medicine
Without a License?, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 195,217-18 (1998).
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Owens & Wilson, supra note 94, at 2.
129. Risk pools of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries are generally not mixed with
regular indemnity insurance populations because of the distinct needs of these
populations. Robert B. Hackey, Commentary, The Politics of Reform, 25 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 211, 219 (2000) (noting the use of separate risk pools for Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries).
130. The most troublesome elements were listed as:
Basing the decision to pay an incentive on the cost performance of a single
physician, who, in most cases, will not admit a large number of Medicare patients
to the hospital during any given period.
Basing the decision to pay an incentive on the cost performance of a physician or
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with physician incentive plans that do not contain clear provisions for
utilization and quality of care review.1
3 1
Some fear that gainsharing arrangements encourage physicians
to limit the care they provide patients, including limiting or denying
tests or treatments and underscheduling return appointments. 3 2 For
example, if an incentive plan is based on a one-month time period,
during any particular month, a physician might schedule as many low-
cost patients as possible while postponing appointments with patients
in greater need of care. 3 Moreover, physicians may be tempted to
hasten a patient's discharge before it is prudent or medically safe. 4
Even if such cost-cutting behavior is of no medical consequence to
the patient, it could potentially weaken the bonds of the fiduciary,
doctor-patient relationship. 35 Physicians participating in incentive
programs may weigh the benefits of certain treatments not against
the best interests of the patient, but against the hospital's bottom
line.
36
In addition to the legal and regulatory problems raised by
gainsharing arrangements, hospitals also must contend with the
group of physicians over a short period of time, such as a month, which also
reduces the number of patients over which cost performance is measured.
Basing the amount of the physician's incentive payment on a percentage of the
physician's contribution to the hospital's savings or profit.
GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-4; see also Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at
37,986 ("[N]o combination of features could guarantee that such plans would not be
subject to abuse.").
131. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
132. See Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 161 (noting the possible consequences of
financial incentives to limit care); see also Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care:
the Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. POL'Y. 23, 31 (1986)
(explaining that pressures for physicians to minimize costs may encourage them to delay
testing, treatment, or consulting specialists, thereby putting patients at risk).
133. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 15.
134. Kosecoff et al., supra note 7, at 1980. Some commentators disagree, noting that
physicians adhere to a value system where the guiding principle is always the welfare of
the patient and profitability is merely a secondary consideration. See McDowell, supra
note 37, at 711; see also PAuL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 23 (1982) ("[Mjedicine and other professions have historically distinguished
themselves from business and trade by claiming to be above the market and pure
commercialism.").
135. Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 161-62. Although these arrangements could
compromise the traditional value system of the medical profession, the PPS and the
current state of hospital finance make it "critical" that physicians become more cost-
conscious. See Bruce E. Spivey, The Relation Between Hospital Management and Medical
Staff Under a Prospective-Payment System, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 984, 986 (1984).
136. See generally William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws
and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1701, 1753, 1757-59 (1999) (discussing the
effects of new forms of compensation on physician behavior).
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possibility that the arrangement will not effect the physician's
behavior. Physicians are loath, or perhaps unable, to give up a
tradition of fee-for-service and the belief that more is better.
137
Further, the accounting systems needed to monitor and regulate the
arrangements and patient care are costly and complex.
38
D. Strengths of Gainsharing Arrangements: Cost Effective, Quality
Care
Although gainsharing arrangements have received their share of
criticism from government and regulatory bodies, such arrangements
have also been applauded as effective and beneficial devices. 9
Gainsharing programs share the goals of the PPS, including the desire
to provide cost-efficient health care."' Because most programs
condition payments to physicians on the physicians' ability to
maintain or achieve certain levels of quality in the services they
provide, gainsharing arrangements enhance the quality of care
received by the beneficiary.'4' In recognition of this positive effect,
the OIG Special Advisory Bulletin stated that "appropriately
structured gainsharing arrangements may offer significant
benefits."'42 For hospitals, the benefits of gainsharing arrangements
include lower hospital costs, improved operational efficiencies, and
established procedural and medical protocols that improve the
overall quality of patient care. 43
137. See Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 158; see also Hall, supra note 80, at 434
("Effective institutional control strategies, however, are unlikely to fit well within a legal
structure that has evolved under a traditional, unrestrained reimbursement environment in
which physician interests and authority have predominated."). Others contend physicians'
deeply embedded professional sovereignty makes it foolish to predict the collapse of their
dominance based on a few cracks in the surface. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL
POWERS 129 (1986). "Thus, preserving their professional sovereignty is likely a primary
motive for [the AMA and physicians] attacking DRG incentive plans." Hall, supra note
80, at 503.
138. See Washlick, supra note 1, at 3.
139. Telephone Interview with Robert Homchick, supra note 15.
140. See McDowell, supra note 37, at 732. It has also been argued that gainsharing
arrangements are less conducive to the typical fraud situation in which physicians are paid
for referrals, thus creating incentives for over-utilization. Id. at 733. In contrast,
gainsharing arrangements emphasize reduction in utilization for admitted patients. Id.
141. Fischer, supra note 50, at 2.
142. Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at 37,985.
143. Washlick, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that the standardization of procedures and
medical protocols serves as an inducement for physicians to follow the established 'best
practices' in order to achieve the highest levels of quality of care and cost efficiency).
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Gainsharing programs are also reported to improve worker
performance."4 For physicians, gainsharing arrangements offer the
opportunity for increased income.145  Also, such arrangements
encourage an atmosphere where the physicians, administrators, and
other medical staff are personally invested in the management of
departmental activities.'46 Aligning the interests of physicians and
administrators helps to "improve[] quality and efficiency of care."'47
Further, gainsharing arrangements do not sacrifice "the ability of
the physicians to individualize the care they provide their patients."'"
Although some suggest that physicians should not ration care,149
physicians are still better equipped to perform this function than any
other entity, group, or individual. Because physicians have the
technical education and experience and are familiar with their
patients, they are best equipped to judge the appropriateness of
particular treatments, tests, and products, given the particular
situation, patient, and symptoms. 5 By and large, arrangements
today seek to encourage physicians to use certain brands, generic
products, and alternative treatments, while maintaining the necessary
144. See Daniel J.B. Mitchell et al., Alternative Pay Systems, Firm Performance, and
Productivity, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIvrrY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 15, 67-68
(Alan S. Blindered ed., 1990).
145. See generally Owens & Wilson, supra note 94, at 1-4 (explaining how different
elements of gainsharing programs offer increases in physician compensation).
146. See Washlick, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that the increased focus and interest in
the management of departmental activities is not typical of hospital settings).
147. Hall, supra note 80, at 504-08 (explaining the historic divergence of interests of
physicians and administrators and the current need to align their goals).
148. Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 173.
149. Many observers argue that physicians should not ration health care because a
doctor is incapable of ascertaining all of the necessary information to make a qualified
decision as to whether or not she should ration care. See Orentlicher, supra note 25, at
165; Daniel P. Sulmasy, Physicians, Cost Control and Ethics, 116 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 920, 921 (1992); John E. Wennberg et. al., Are Hospital Services Rationed in New
Haven or Over-Utilised in Boston?, THE LANCET, May 23, 1987, at 1185, 1185. It is hard
to imagine, for example, a physician is capable of knowing the extent of benefit a patient
may receive from a particular form or type of treatment, the likelihood that such a benefit
would be realized, the costs of the treatment, and the benefits other patients may have
received if the funds had alternatively been spent on them. See Sulmasy, supra, at 921.
Moreover, physicians historically lack experience in making rationing decisions.
See Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 166. Primarily concerned with the needs of individual
patients, physicians do not typically weigh those needs against the greater needs of society.
See Sage, supra note 136, at 1753-59. Arguably, a considerable conflict of interest exists
between the needs of a specific patient, the needs of the provider's other patients, and the
provider's own financial needs. See id. at 167.
150. Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 170 (noting that the factors affecting the decision
about what type of treatment is most appropriate include cost, potential for benefit, and
likelihood of favorable outcome).
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flexibility to leave the important medical decisions to the doctor."'
These arrangements provide physicians with the options and the
personal autonomy necessary to be effective caregivers.'52
III. REGULATORY AND LEGAL OBSTACLES TO GAINSHARING
ARRANGEMENTS
Despite the benefits gainsharing arrangements offer, the current
regulatory climate has sealed the fate of most plans. As noted, the
CUT statute addressed by the Special Advisory Bulletin is not the
only regulatory challenge facing gainsharing arrangements. 53 Such
arrangements must comply with a myriad of federal laws and
regulations. Hospitals regularly file advisory opinion requests with
regulatory agencies and the IRS hoping to discover what
arrangements comply with current laws and regulations. 4  Among
the laws and regulations of greatest consequence to gainsharing
arrangements are the anti-kickback laws, 55 the Stark anti-referral
laws,'156 tax-exempt regulations,
157 and the CMP statute.5 8
A. Anti-Kickback Statutes
The anti-kickback laws were not intended to apply to payments
made in connection with physician incentive plans'5 9 and do not
specifically address gainsharing programs. 60  Nonetheless,
arrangements that directly or indirectly induce physicians to order or
purchase treatments or services reimbursed by a federal program in
exchange for payment are within the laws' scope.' 61  Thus,
151. See id.
152. See generally id. at 177 (explaining that physicians still have the freedom and
control to make the treatment decisions they deem appropriate).
153. For a discussion of the Special Advisory Bulletin, see infra notes 16-21 and
accompanying text.
154. See Telephone Interview with Marilou King, supra note 10.
155. See infra notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 170-84 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
159. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.
160. Fischer, supra note 50, at 5. This omission, however, does not necessarily mean
that the regulations do not apply.
161. See Social Security Act § 1128A(b), 42 U.S.C.A § 1320a-7b(b) (West Supp. 2000).
The anti-kickback laws include provisions prohibiting the knowing or willful "offering,
paying, soliciting or receiving" of any "remuneration in exchange for, or to induce, the
referral of a patient for an item or service covered by a federal program ... or to
recommend or arrange for the purchase of such an item or service." Id. § 1320a-7a(b); see
also Washlick, supra note 1, at 6 (recounting the application of the applicable anti-
kickback statutes to gainsharing arrangements).
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gainsharing arrangements that compensate physicians based on
increased profits attributable to such conduct likely violate the anti-
kickback laws. 62
To protect themselves and their incentive programs, some
hospitals have sought refuge in the anti-kickback safe harbor
provision 6' for Personal Services and Management Contracts.164
Because this safe harbor requires that compensation be
predetermined and volume-neutral, 165 most gainsharing arrangements
will not likely qualify. If a gainsharing program cannot consider the
number of referrals in fashioning incentive structures, it will be
unable to target those physicians who most often refer patients to the
hospital-the group of physicians most likely to influence expenses
and savings. 66
The importance of adhering to the anti-kickback laws is
underscored by the laws' criminal component-a violation could
constitute a felony.167  Convictions carry fines up to $25,000,
imprisonment up to five years, or both. 68  More significantly, if
162. See Washlick, supra note 1, at 6. Gainsharing arrangements attempting to comply
with existing laws and regulations have employed various formulas. Some formulas
exclude the number of cases referred to the hospital in excess of the year prior to the
implementation of the gainsharing program from the incentive compensation pool.
Fischer, supra note 50, at 7. Other formulas exclude those portions of payments reflecting
an increase in "relative market share" by the hospital at the time of the gainsharing
program. Id. Still others calculate "savings on commercial cases and then extrapolat[e]
those savings to the hospital's traditional Medicare/Medicaid patient mix." Id. Because
the health care needs and costs of Medicare and Medicaid recipients vary greatly from
those privately insured patients, these types of formulas are problematic and often prove
less successful. Id.
163. SNOE, supra note 24, at 643.
164. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (1999). This safe harbor is also commonly known as the
Personal Services Exception.
165. See id.; see also Fischer, supra note 50, at 5 (discussing the scope of the safe harbor
provision); Washlick, supra note 1, at 6 (describing compliance with safe harbor
requirements). Specifically, the safe harbor requires that the gainsharing program (1) be
"set out in writing and signed by the parties;" (2) "specif[y] the services to be provided;"
(3) be for a term of not less than one year; and (4) set out the aggregate compensation a
physician may receive. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)(1)-(2), (4). The regulations mandate that
the physician's compensation be "consistent with fair market value ... and not [be]
determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or
business otherwise generated between the parties for which payment may be made ...
under Medicare." Id. § 1001.952(d)(5). The most problematic element of the
requirements is that the bonuses must be determined in advance, including bonuses
determined according to a formula. Washlick, supra note 1, at 6.
166. See id. at 5-6.
167. Meador, supra note 16, at 23 (listing the penalties for anti-kickback violations).
168. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (West Supp. 2000).
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convicted, the hospital or physician may be prohibited from
participating in all federal health care programs. 69
B. Stark Anti-Referral Laws
Another area of continuing concern for hospitals that have
implemented gainsharing programs and for hospitals considering
implementing such arrangements is the Stark anti-referral laws. 170
The Stark laws prohibit physicians from referring patients to entities
in which the physicians or an immediate family member have a
financial interest.171  These laws strongly imply that gainsharing
programs are impermissible because they provide remuneration that
could effectively limit the care given to patients.72  Statutory
exceptions exist for some types of arrangements, but qualifying for
these exceptions while maintaining an effective gainsharing program
is difficult-any incentive suggesting that physicians limit or reduce
care could be deemed violative. 7 3
As stated, the Personal Services Exception'4 requires that any
compensation paid to the providing physician be pre-determined and
not a function of the "volume or value of any referrals between the
physicians and the hospital."'7 5 Regulatory agencies charged with
enforcing the Stark laws have not definitively indicated that a pre-set
formula that uses the number or volume of referrals in calculating
incentive payments would qualify as compensation set in advance. 6
169. See id.; Washlick, supra note 1, at 6. The government bears the burden of proving
that the parties "knowingly and willfully" engaged in the respective payment practice in
violation of the anti-kickback statute. Washlick, supra note 1, at 6.
170. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395nn, 1396b(s) (West Supp. 2000).
171. See § 1395nn; 42 C.F.R. § 411.350 (1999). The Stark laws are largely interpreted as
the congressional response to physician self-referrals and the consequential increase in the
costs of the medical services funded by Medicaid and Medicare. See FURROW ET AL.,
supra note 62, §§ 13-8 to 13-9; Douglas A. Blair, The "PIP" Regulations in Perspective:
Analysis and Comparisons with Other Federal Regulations Governing Physician Incentive
Plans, 29 U. MEM. L. REv. 137, 153 (1998) (noting that, in general, the regulations do not
allow physicians to make referrals for certain health services to entities in which the
physician or a member of the physician's immediate family has a financial relationship).
172. Washlick, supra note 1, at 6.
173. See id. at 6 (noting that none of the exceptions particularly applies to gainsharing
arrangements); see also infra notes 174-84 and accompanying text (explaining exceptions).
174. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn.
175. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (1999); Fischer, supra note 50, at 3; see also Nursing Home
Consultants, Inc. v. Quantum Health Serv., 926 F. Supp. 835, 844 (E.D. Ark. 1996)
(holding that these safe harbor provisions were not applicable to a marketing agreement
because the "compensation was directly pegged to the number of sales generated").
176. See Blair, supra note 171, at 163. The Fair Market Value (FMV) Exception
appears to indicate that pre-set formulas are permissible under the Stark laws. See id.
Yet, for whatever reason, the same wording was not employed in the Personal Services
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The HCFA, 177 however, has stated that the use of referrals, either
directly or indirectly, when determining compensation, does not fall
under the Personal Services Exception, and thus violates the Stark
laws, even if set in advance.178 Therefore, when patients are referred
to a hospital by a physician participating in a gainsharing program,
and the referral generates compensation, either directly or indirectly,
the referral and the gainsharing arrangement violate the Stark laws.
Both the physician and hospital would therefore be subject to civil
penalties.
179
In contrast, the Fair Market Value (FMV) Exception,180 which
has not yet been codified or implemented, provides greater flexibility
in the use of gainsharing arrangements.' The language of the
exception suggests that it would be permissible to use formulas to
determine physician compensation provided these formulas and
compensation are determined in advance of the arrangement's
implementation.Y The FMV exception, however, requires that the
compensation not take into account the volume of referrals; it further
requires that gainsharing programs either fall within the anti-
kickback safe harbor or otherwise comply with the anti-kickback
laws. 3  These anti-kickback compliance requirements present
considerable obstacles for gainsharing arrangements because such
arrangements are unlikely to qualify for the anti-kickback safe
harbor or otherwise comply with the anti-kickback laws-setting a
physician's compensation prior to any services being rendered in an
incentive-type program is simply too difficult.1
Exception. See id.
177. The HCFA is charged with the responsibility of issuing advisory opinions relating
to the Stark laws as well as administering Medicare and Medicaid. See Fischer, supra note
50, at 5.
178. See id. at 4.
179. Id.
180. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Physicians' Referrals to Health Care Entities
With Which They Have Financial Relationships, 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1686 (proposed Jan. 9,
1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424, 435 & 455). See generally Washlick, supra
note 1, at 6-7 (noting that the FMV Exception was introduced with the proposed
regulations).
181. See generally Andrew B. Wachler & Phyllis A. Avery, Stark II Proposed
Regulations: Rules Offer Additional Guidance While Regulators Seek More Input from
Health Care Community, HEALTH LAw., Jan. 1998, at 1, 11 (explaining the proposal and
its benefits).
182. See Fischer, supra note 50, at 5.
183. See id.; Washlick, supra note 1, at 7 (explaining that the arrangement must be
commercially reasonable and further the legitimate business purposes of the parties).
184. See Fischer, supra note 50, at 5 (noting that the difficulty stems from an inability
to construct a formula and resulting compensation statement prior to any services actually
2000]
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C. Tax Obstacles Including Exemptions and Joint Ventures
In addition to the anti-kickback and Stark anti-referral laws,
hospitals must also consider the ramifications of gainsharing
arrangements on the tax-exempt status of bonds used to generate
capital to fund the hospitals' operations. If a gainsharing
arrangement utilizes hospital facilities and space financed by tax-
exempt bonds, to maintain tax-exempt status, the arrangement must
comply with the tax-exempt bond rules and the IRS guidelines for
permissible business uses.185  Revenue Procedure 97-13,186 a safe
harbor provision, establishes the guidelines for the "duration and
compensation methodology" of certain hospital contracts, including
gainsharing arrangements,187 which are related to portions of the
hospital financed by tax-exempt bonds. 88 Conforming to this safe
harbor assures hospitals that the particular contract will not be
deemed "private business use" under the Internal Revenue Code and
that the bonds will remain tax-exempt. 89
Under Revenue Procedure 97-13, physicians can receive no
more than fifty percent of their total compensation from incentives. 9'
The remainder must constitute a fixed fee not in excess of the fair
market value of the services rendered.'9' The fixed fee may be an
being rendered).
185. See Washlick, supra note 1, at 4.
186. See Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-1 C.B. 632.
187. According to the IRS, "any service contract that confers a preferential right to any
use of hospital assets financed by the proceeds of tax-exempt bonds ... is subject to 97-
13." Fischer, supra note 50, at 8 (discussing Revenue Procedure 97-13).
188. Id. at 7.
189. See id. at 7-8.
190. Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-1 C.B. 632; Fischer, supra note 50, at 8 (explaining
physician compensation limits). For hospitals without any outstanding tax-exempt bonds
Revenue Procedure 97-13 is a non-issue. See Fischer, supra note 50, at 8-9. Thus, for-
profit hospitals need not concern themselves with 97-13. This dichotomy is important;
private hospitals may implement programs that base physician compensation at levels
greater than fifty percent of the costs saved by those physicians. See id. These hospitals
face little to no risk, and the programs pay for themselves. See id.
191. See Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-1 C.B. 632 (explaining that the fixed fee and percentage
requirements are applicable when dealing with five-year agreements). In some
agreements of shorter duration, it is permissible to base physician compensation on
percentages of expenses or revenues. See Fischer, supra note 50, at 8 (noting the greater
latitude allotted to two-year agreements but explaining that these agreements must be
unilaterally terminable by the hospital at the end of the first year). Understandably,
physicians are hesitant to enter into agreements where the hospital is free to terminate the
contract, without penalty, after the first year. See id. To comply with the terms of the safe
harbor, the maximum duration a gainsharing arrangement is allowed to extend is two
years. For practical purposes, however, a longer duration is not really effective. See
Washlick, supra note 1, at 5.
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established rate, such as fifty dollars an hour;"9 it may not, however,
be based on a share of the hospital's net profits. 19 3 In sum, the only
safe way to avoid Revenue Procedure 97-13 is not to use tax-exempt
bonds for capitalization. If a gainsharing arrangement allows a
physician to share in cost-savings generated by assets financed
through tax-exempt bonds, the gainsharing arrangement is subject to
97-13.194 While ensuring that no more than fifty percent of a
physician's compensation is incentive-based should guarantee the
arrangement's survival under 97-13, the arrangement would likely
violate other regulations such as the Stark anti-referral laws or anti-
kickback laws.'
In addition to Revenue Procedure 97-13, the IRS has issued a
series of private letter rulings addressing the tax consequences of
gainsharing arrangements. For example, in the early 1990s, the IRS
issued a series of private letter rulings involving physician joint
ventures. 196 In these rulings, the IRS invalidated the arrangements,
stating that the ventures constituted a reward system to physicians for
patient referrals rather than an institutional effort to improve patient
care.' 97 The rulings led hospitals to consider and construct new
arrangements to align physicians' financial incentives with those of
the hospitals.198 In January 1999, the IRS issued two letter rulings,
just prior to the Special Advisory Bulletin. 199 Consistent with the
earlier rulings, the IRS implied that certain arrangements do not
jeopardize a hospital's tax-exempt status.200 As long as the
192. See Fischer, supra note 50, at 8.
193. Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-1 C.B. 632.
194. See id.
195. If the overall amount is greater than the fair market value for compensation, there
is a potential anti-kickback violation. See Social Security Act § 1128(b), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1320a-7b(b) (West Supp. 2000). If compensation is viewed as an inducement for
referrals to the hospital, there is a potential Stark violation. See id. § 1395nn.
196. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-33-037 (Aug. 14, 1992); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-047 (July 31,
1992).
197. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-33-037 (Aug. 14, 1992); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-047 (July 31,
1992); see also Jaklevic, supra note 17, at 12 (discussing the rulings).
198. Jaklevic, supra note 17, at 12.
199. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-16-037 (Jan. 25, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-18-054 (Jan. 11,
1999).
200. The cases dealt with hospitals paying physicians a certain percentage of the cost-
savings that the physicians had realized. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-16-037 (Jan. 25, 1999); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 99-18-054 (Jan. 11, 1999). Specifically, the hospitals entered into "Participation
Agreements" with a group of cardiologists who were on staff at the hospitals. See Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 99-16-037 (Jan. 25, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-18-054 (Jan. 11, 1999). Under the
agreements, the cardiologists would engage in those activities necessary to assist the
hospital in developing and implementing processes aimed at cost-effective utilization of
hospital resources and improving the quality of care provided to cardiac patients. See
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arrangement is aligned with the improvement of the health care
services rendered by the hospital, it complies with the current tax
laws.
201
D. Civil Monetary Penalty Statutes (CMPs) and their Crippling
Effect on Gainsharing Arrangements
Perhaps the greatest threat to gainsharing arrangements is the
CMP provision of the Social Security Act.20 According to the OIG's
recent Special Advisory Bulletin, hospital-physician gainsharing
arrangements involving Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries violate
the CMP statutes per se.203 Focusing on sections 1128A(b)(1) and (2)
of the Act, which regulate hospital-sponsored physician incentive
plans,2°4 the Bulletin addressed the concern that the use of incentive
programs was reducing the number of services provided to Medicare
and Medicaid beneficiaries.0" According to the OIG, the purpose of
the Bulletin and the Act was to prevent hospital payments from
influencing and "corrupting" the providing physician's "medical
Washlick, supra note 1, at 4-5. Included in the agreements were "program integrity
requirements" aimed at eliminating the chance for adverse or unintended effects on the
care received by the cardiac patients. See id. After one year, if there were cost-savings
related to the delivery of cardiac services and the pre-established patient satisfaction and
medical outcomes thresholds had been met, some of the costs saved would be put into a
fund. See id. The money in the fund would then be disbursed to the participating
physicians based on the physician group's performance. See id. at 3-4. The amount paid
was subject to review by an independent third party appraiser to ensure the amount was a
true reflection of the fair market value of the services rendered (protecting against
inflation of payments given to physicians). See id. at 4-5. The IRS mandated that certain
criteria for medical outcomes and patient satisfaction must be met before any physician
groups could share in the pooled money generated by cost-savings. See id. Further, the
money would need to be allocated according to how well the different groups met
designated process improvement initiatives. See id. These same arrangements have been
submitted to the OIG, but the OIG has not yet ruled on them. See Jaklevic, supra note 17,
at 12.
201. See Washlick, supra note 1, at 4-5. A new revenue procedure providing a safe
harbor to gainsharing programs could alleviate concerns about compliance and tax-exempt
status under the current tax laws. See Fischer, supra note 50, at 9. This could help
alleviate the distinct disadvantage for those hospitals that have outstanding tax-exempt
bonds and consequently cannot create more "cost-efficient" gainsharing programs. See id.
202. Social Security Act § 1128A(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a (West Supp. 2000).
203. Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at 37,985 (explaining the Act's
application to hospital-sponsored physician incentive plans).
204. See supra note 20 (quoting section 1128A(b)(1)-(2) of the Act).
205. See D. McCarty Thornton & Kevin G. McAnaney, Recent Commentary Distorts
HHS IG's Gainsharing Bulletin (Aug. 1999), at http://oig.hhs.gov/frdalrtlbnagain.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Review). Thornton is Chief
Counsel to the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;
McAnaney is Chief of the Industry Guidance Branch of the Office of Counsel to the
Inspector General).
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judgment as to the provision of hospital services to his or her
patients."2" As the House Committee Report accompanying section
1128A(b) of the Act advanced, "such incentive payments may create
a conflict of interest that limits the ability of the physician to exercise
independent professional judgment in the best interest of his or her
patients."'207
The mandates of the Special Advisory Bulletin drew the
attention and concern of the health care industry-it effectively
prohibits all gainsharing programs between physicians and hospitals
that provide services to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.0 s
According to the Bulletin, facilities and providers that knowingly
make or accept payments that reduce or limit services to Medicare
and Medicaid beneficiaries at the facility, or under the physician's
care, are subject to civil monetary penalties of up to $2000 per act per
each Medicare or Medicaid beneficiary involved. 09 While the OIG
recognized that some gainsharing arrangements could be ultimately
206. See id. at 3 (responding to commentaries on the Special Advisory Bulletin); see
also Washlick, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining the OIG's position that gainsharing
arrangements offered too great a risk for abuse). This risk of corruption is attributed to
the increasing pressure felt by hospitals to increase the percentage of savings shared with
the physicians. This increase could lead to the manipulation of hospital accounts and
balance sheets in order to construe the documents to appear as though there were greater
savings, and therefore, the physician was entitled to a greater benefit. The OIG
apparently believes that the health care industry currently lacks adequate self-monitoring
programs that could regulate and temper these types of abuses. See id.
207. H.R. REP. No. 99-727, at 444 (1986) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/8:99-727), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3607, 3841. The prohibition of gainsharing programs in an effort to
protect Medicare beneficiaries and maintain the quality of patient has been questioned.
See generally Homchick, supra note 5 (addressing the Bulletin, its merits, and its
consistency with current statutes and previous statements by the OIG). Some speculate
whether the government was actually concerned with quality of care or whether the
government wanted to share in the profits achieved at Medicare's expense. See generally
Mary Chris Jaklevic, HCFA May Revive Doc Bonus Idea, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Aug.
16, 1999, at 42, 42 (explaining the HCFA's new managed care demonstration project and
the possible rationale for its use). The HCFA's recent demonstration announcement
illustrates the possibility of an ulterior motive. Recently, the HCFA announced that it was
contemplating a new demonstration project in which Medicare would "pay windfalls to
large multi-specialty physician groups that lower total Medicare expenditures." Id.
Specifically, this "gainsharing" arrangement would benchmark participants "against their
own experience." Id. Subsequent bonuses would be tied to direct physician services and
Medicare spending as a whole. Id. Those advocating the HCFA's proposal stress that
these arrangements differ from hospital gainsharing arrangements which usually involve
small specialty groups; the HCFA plan would involve large multi-specialty groups. Id. It
remains to be seen how the HCFA will achieve these goals in light of the OIG's
unequivocal pronouncement that similar arrangements constructed by hospitals violate the
CMP. See id.
208. Fischer, supra note 50, at 1.
209. Id.
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beneficial, absent a change in the law, these programs are
impermissible,21 and the OIG was without authority to offer
regulatory relief.
211
In August 1999, following some confusion concerning the
Bulletin's mandates, the OIG released a notice attempting to clarify
some of the rumored interpretations of the Bulletin.
112  The OIG
stated that language suggesting that the provider needs to possess the
specific intent either to directly or indirectly induce physicians to
withhold "medically necessary" treatments and services from
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries was misinterpreted.2 1 3 Further,
the OIG sought to dispel the belief that for there to be an actual
violation, the incentive arrangement must "actually cause a reduction
or limitation of medically necessary services. 214 The OIG stated that
the Act encompasses all services, not just medically necessary ones,
and only requires a "showing of intent to induce a reduction of
services, not an actual reduction. 
' 215
The OIG's broad interpretation of section 1128A(b) clearly ends
any and all physician incentive plans that condition payments on
savings that can be linked, in any way, to reductions in hospital costs
for treatment to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.
1 6  As
D. McCarty Thornton, Chief Counsel to the Inspector General of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services noted, no regulation
mandates proof of "actual adverse effects on particular patients.
217
210. Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at 37,985 (stating that "appropriately
structured gainsharing arrangements may offer significant benefits").
211. See id.; Fischer, supra note 50, at 1.
212. American Health Law. Ass'n, DHHS 0IG Clarifies Gainsharing Ruling; Managed
Care Incentive Deals Not Subject to Penalties, at http://www.healthlawyers.org/
ofnote%5Foiggainsharingletter.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2000) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
213. See Thornton & McAnaney, supra note 205.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id. ("[We believe that any honest reader of the broad, unqualified statutory
language will concede that it clearly encompasses gainsharing arrangements involving
monetary payments by hospitals to physicians conditioned on the physicians reducing their
patients' hospital treatment costs.").
217. Id. Payment under a gainsharing arrangement need not be tied to an actual
"diminution" in care. See id. If the hospital is aware that the payment could serve as an
influence that ultimately results in a reduction or limitation of the number of services




E. The OIG's Proposed Rules for Incentive Programs in Health
Care Plans
In addition to the OIG's attempted clarification of the
permissibility of gainsharing arrangements, the OIG's proposed rules
for incentive programs offer further guidance to hospitals trying to
grasp the complexity of the situation.218 These rules were proposed in
1994,219 and although the OIG has not promulgated a final rule, it
explicitly relied on the proposed rules as support for its position in
the Special Advisory Bulletin.' The OIG's proposed rules address
which physician incentive plans should be prohibited and explain the
application of the proposed rules to gainsharing arrangements. 221
Significantly, the preamble emphatically iterates the OIG's position
that incentive plans based on reduction of care should be
prohibited.222
218. Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Civil Money Penalties for Hospital
Physician Incentive Plans, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,571, 61,571 (proposed Dec. 1, 1994) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1003).
219. See id.
220. See Thornton & McAnaney, supra note 205.
221. See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Civil Money Penalties for Hospital
Physician Incentive Plans, 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,572.
222. The preamble states:
With PPS permitting hospitals to profit from Medicare and Medicaid patients
when such patients are treated at a lower cost than the present payment level,
many hospitals have had a new range of financial incentives made available to
them for (1) underproviding services to program beneficiaries; and (2) shortening
their length-of-stay by discharging them too early.
We believe ... there may be certain types of hospital incentive plans to
physicians, such as those designated to reward the timely review and completion
of medical records which do not impact on direct patient care responsibilities or
do not affect patient referral patterns, that may be acceptable and therefore not
be subject to civil money penalties under this provision.
We believe, however, that it is impossible and impractical for the OIG to
specifically indicate in regulations what specific criteria may make up an
acceptable hospital physician incentive plan ... [a]s with all [CMP] cases, the
OIG will review and assess the nature and scope of each suspect incentive plan
on a case-by-case basis to determine its specific intent and acceptability.
See id. at 61,572-73; see also Thornton & McAnaney, supra note 205 (stating that the
preamble and Special Advisory Bulletin are wholly congruent). To combat the criticisms
of the OIG's reasoning in the Bulletin, Thornton and McAnaney state that those plans
that include "some or all of the 'safeguards' "noted in the report will not automatically be
viewed as permissible, as noted in the preamble of the CMP statute. See id. at 5-6; see also
Homchick, supra note 5, at 14 (explaining the preamble statement); Thornton &
McAnaney, supra note 205 (rejecting the industry's interpretation that the OIG agrees
that there in fact needs to be a case-by-case evaluation in order to determine whether or
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Although some in the healthcare industry argued that the
proposed rules indicated that suspect incentive plans would be dealt
with on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a violation had
occurred, the OIG has since clarified its position.2' According to the
OIG, the proposed rules' case-by-case determination applies to those
physician incentive plans "not relating to direct patient care
responsibilities" and that there will be no case-by-case evaluations
involving direct patient care gainsharing arrangements. z 4
Those hospitals considering implementing joint ventures, as well
as those ventures already in place, would also be subject to the
proposed rules. The final paragraphs of the Special Advisory
Bulletin intended to serve as a "yellow cautionary flag"
' indicating
the OIG's position that joint ventures constitute gainsharing
programs and thus could be subject to the C P statute.22
6  The
possibility that joint ventures violate the CMP statute troubles many
not incentive plans are permissible). Thornton and McAnaney argue that the preamble to
the 1994 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is consistent with the Special Advisory Bulletin
and that these alternative beliefs are part of the false impressions circulating in the
industry. See id.; see also Homchick, supra note 5, at 15-17 (noting industry
interpretations and concerns).
223. See Thornton & McAnaney, supra note 205. The statement was issued in rebuttal
to a recent commentary on the OIG Special Advisory Bulletin authored by the Bureau of
National Affairs, which was circulating throughout the industry. See American Health
Law. Ass'n, OIG Rebuts Commentary on Gainsharing Bulletin, at
http://www.healthlawyers.orglofnote%5Foiggainsharinghcfrrebut.htm (last visited Aug.
27,2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
224. See Thornton & McAnaney, supra note 205. Most gainsharing arrangements
involve physicians with direct patient care responsibilities and seek to modify physicians'
behavior with respect to the services and procedures they provide. See Washlick, supra
note 1, at 3 ("Hospital departments generally targeted for gainsharing consideration are
those with high volume, involving procedure-driven specialties, such as cardiology, where
changes in physician behavior will have the greatest impact .... "). Therefore, most
gainsharing arrangements would not be permissible under the proposed rules.
225. Deanna Bellandi & Mary Chris Jaklevic, What Gainsharing?, MODERN
HEALTHcARE, July 26, 1999, at 8, 8 (quoting HHS spokeswoman Alwyn Cassil).
According to the HHS, specialty hospitals, completely owned by staff physicians, which
monitor costs and alert the staff to the cost-profit ratio, could very likely be deemed a
gainsharing arrangement in violation of the CMP provision. Id.
Payments characterized as inducements for referrals have been found illegal even
when it was an independent contractor referral source and a portion of the payment is
compensation for services rendered. See United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir.
1988); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71-72 (3d Cir. 1985). The HCFA has stated,
however, that return on investment will not necessarily be deemed remuneration or a
kickback when it is strictly tied to ownership and the venture is not a sham. See Medicare
Program; Physician Financial Relationships With, and Referrals to, Health Care Entities
that Furnish Clinical Laboratory Services and Financial Relationship Reporting
Requirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,914,41,959 (Aug. 14, 1995) (codified at 42 C.F.R. 411).
226. See Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at 37,987.
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in the health care industry. 7 Under the Stark laws, Congress carved
out a special exception for physicians invested in whole hospitals.p
The OIG's suggestion that Congress would have created an exception
that violated other regulations seems suspect.229
F. The Managed Care Exception
Hospitals seeking to maintain incentive programs may benefit
from the managed care exception to the scope of the CMP statute.
Under this exception, managed care plans are permitted to
implement physician incentive plans provided they do not induce the
reduction of medically necessary care to individual Medicare or
Medicaid patients and do not place physicians at substantial financial
risk for services not provided by the physician.21°
Under Congress's original scheme, all payments by hospitals or
managed care plans to physicians that serve as inducements for cost-
savings through the reduction of services to Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries were subject to civil monetary penalties. 1 The 1990
amendment, however, excludes managed care plans from the scope
of the CM statute. 2  According to the OIG, the language in
amended sections 1876(i)(8) and 1903(m)(2)(A)(x) of the Social
Security Act demonstrate Congress's intent to regulate Medicare and
Medicaid managed care arrangements involving physician incentive
programs separately. 3  The separate regulation of managed care
arrangements include Medicare risk-based managed care plans that
directly contract with the HCFA and physician incentive plans
227. See Bellandi & JakIevic, supra note 225, at 8.
228. Id.
229. Id. (quoting Carrie Valianti, partner with Epstein, Beckner & Green, a
Washington, D.C. law firm).
230. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A) (West Supp. 2000). Substantial financial risk
exists when a financial incentive puts more than twenty five percent of the physician's
income at risk and the patient panel size is equal to or less than 25,000. There is no limit
on panel sizes greater than 25,000. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 25 (explaining
that where there is substantial financial risk, as defined in the statute, the entity must
provide stop-loss insurance to protect the provider).
231. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(b) (West Supp. 2000).
232. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans in
Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 57 Fed. Reg. 59,024, 59,025 (proposed Dec. 14, 1992)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 417, 434 & 1003). The proposed rules were published in
December 1992. See id. at 59,034-40. The final rules were issued in March 1996. See
Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid
Health Care Organizations, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,430-50 (Mar. 27, 1996) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
pts. 417, 434 & 1003).
233. See Thornton & McAnaney, supra note 205; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm
(addressing managed care regulations).
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connected to subcontracting arrangements between managed care
plans and physician groups or other intermediate entities. 4
The physician incentive regulations, enforced through the CM
statute, also do not apply to Medicare+Choice managed care plans. 25
Medicare+Choice plans, part of the Medicare program, offer a
broader array of health care services based on the types of plans
available in the service area.236 The exemption of Medicare+Choice
plans is based, in part, on the statutory language Congress adopted in
regulating these entities.237 The language mirrored section 1876(i)(8)
of the Act and delegated to the Secretary the authority to regulate
these arrangements. 8
The disparate treatment of non-managed care hospitals seems
unjustified.239 The OIG, however, believes that, given the differences
in the entities themselves, the unequal treatment is warranted.
240 The
OIG argues that beneficiaries in Medicare risk-based managed care
programs understand the inherent economic incentive for the
physician to manage the beneficiaries' care in the most cost efficient
manner.241 Moreover, because the beneficiary also receives a share of
the savings-generally in the form of increased benefits, reduced co-
payments, and greater outpatient prescription drug coverage-the
competing interests are adequately balanced.24
234. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(i) (1999); Medicare and Medicaid Programs;
Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 13,439; Letter from Lewis Morris, Assistant. Inspector General for Legal Affairs,
Office of Counsel to the Inspector General, to an unnamed individual 1 (Aug. 19, 1999), at
http:l/vww.hhs.gov/progorgloiglfrdalrtlgsletter.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (responding to questions concerning the applicability of CMPs to risk-based
Medicare and Medicaid managed care programs).
235. Letter from Lewis Morris to unnamed individual, supra note 234, at 1 (stating that
CMPs do not apply to Medicare managed care programs).
236. Press Release, HCFA Press Office, New Health Options Available Under
Medicare+Choice (June 18, 1998), at http:l/www.hcfa.gov/news/pr19981pr61898.htm (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
237. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-22 (West Supp. 2000); Letter from Lewis Morris to unnamed
individual, supra note 234, at 1.
238. Letter from Lewis Morris to unnamed individual, supra note 234, at 1.
239. Competition from alternative delivery systems like HMOs serves as a threat to the
financial stability of hospitals. See Robert S. Bonney, Hospital Survival Strategies for the
1980's, 40 AM. J. HOSP. PHARM. 1483,1483 (1983).
240. Thornton & McAnaney, supra note 205.
241. Id. at 4.
242. Id. In contrast, under fee-for-service arrangements, individuals incur much higher
costs in exchange for unlimited access to physicians and providers of their choice. Id.
("Fee-for-service beneficiaries incur substantial additional financial obligations ... in
exchange for unfettered access to physicians of their choice."). The fees paid for services
rendered, as well as any cost-savings by the provider, benefit the hospitals and
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IV. OPTIONS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Although, the OIG's position concerning gainsharing is
troubling, "as a practical matter, ... people are going to have to
accept [it] whether they like it or not."'243 The risk of testing the
applicability of the CMP provision, with the possible exclusion from
the Medicare program, is a chance that hospitals are not willing to
take.2* Moreover, hospitals are loath to risk violation of the anti-
kickback and Stark anti-referral laws. Thus, the hospital industry is
eager to know what, if any, incentive arrangements will comply with
federal law. 45
The OIG has carefully avoided taking a position on what it
considers appropriate and compliant gainsharing arrangements.
Nevertheless, based on the OIG's Special Advisory Bulletin and
current federal law governing incentive arrangements involving the
Medicare and Medicaid programs, as well as previous actions and
statements by the regulating agencies, hospitals have some room to
utilize some types of incentive arrangements. 46 Hospitals' options
include creating incentive programs that do not include Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries, basing physician compensation on patient
satisfaction and efficiency of care, adhering to the General
Accounting Office's 1986 recommendations, lobbying for the explicit
permission of gainsharing and incentive programs, and soliciting
advisory opinions to assess an arrangement's permissibility on an
individualized basis 47
participating physicians-not Medicare or the beneficiaries. Id. The OIG believes that
this was Congress's rationale for the differing regulation of the incentive plans. Id.
243. Jaklevic, supra note 12, at 12 (quoting Jim Gaynor, a health care lawyer with
McDermott, Will & Emery).
244. Id. Further, as previously noted, there are statutes and regulations in place,
including the Stark and anti-kickback laws and the CMP statute. If the arrangements
violate these laws, they will be sanctioned accordingly. Office of the Inspector General,
HHS/OIG Fiscal Year 2000 Work Plan-Health Care Financing Administration 37, at
http://www.dhhs.gov/progorg/oig/wrkpln/2000Ihcfa.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2000) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). The work plan for fiscal year 2000 has Medicare
fraud and abuse detection and regulation among those projects that will receive continued
attention. Id.
245. Telephone Interview with Robert Homchick, supra note 15 (noting the hospital
industry's desire to comply with federal law but emphasizing the industry's need for cost-
saving options).
246. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(b)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2000); GAO REPORT, supra note 2,
at 2-4; Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at 37,985; Homchick, supra note 5, at 1;
Thornton & McAnaney, supra note 205.
247. See infra notes 248-305 (explaining possible options and solutions for hospitals
looking to implement or change their current physician programs).
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
A. Incentive Programs that Exclude Medicare and Medicaid
Beneficiaries
Obviously, excluding Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries from
gainsharing programs would solve many of the compliance problems
facing hospitals and providers because the arrangements would no
longer be subject to federal regulations and statutes. The OIG has
unequivocally stated that discretionary enforcement against those
gainsharing arrangements that were "expeditiously" terminated after
the publication of the Bulletin and were not in violation of any other
federal law is the only "favorable" treatment it would provide to a
gainsharing arrangement including or aimed at Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries.248 At a minimum, such arrangements would
have to provide assurance that there was minimal risk of fraud or
abuse and that the quality of care for Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries was in no way compromised. 49
Considering that Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries receive
nearly fifty percent of all services rendered, excluding Medicare or
Medicaid recipients from gainsharing arrangements is not a viable
option for most hospitals." Further, because recipients of Medicare
and Medicaid are generally less healthy than non-recipients,211
gainsharing programs that do not include these individuals will fail to
address the areas where there is the greatest potential for cost
reduction. 2
Creating Medicare and Medicaid HMOs is one alternative to
excluding Medicare and Medicaid recipients altogether. These types
of plans are not subject to the Social Security Act under the managed
care exception,2 3 and are therefore not subject to the penalties
established under the Act's CMP provision. 4 The complexity and
financial instability of Medicare and Medicaid HMOs, however,
248. Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at 37,985. This favorable treatment,
however, presumes compliance with section 1128A(b) of the Social Security Act. Section
1128A(b) prohibits any incentive arrangement that constitutes an inducement to reduce or
limit services to individuals entitled to Medicare or Medicaid benefits. Social Security Act
§ 1128A(b)(1)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(b)(1)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 2000).
249. Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at 37,985.
250. By the Numbers, Controlling Costs Starts with Medicare and Medicaid, MODERN
HEALTHcARE, July 19, 1999 (Supp.), at 30,30.
251. Fischer, supra note 50, at 4.
252. Id.
253. For a discussion of the managed care exception, see infra notes 230-42.
254. Homchick, supra note 5, at 24. Medicare and Medicaid HMOs are not subject to
CMPs because of the managed care exception. Id.
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undercuts the viability of this alternative.' 5 Indeed, the characteristic
losses suffered by Medicare and Medicaid HMOs has led many to
consider the prospect of serving a Medicaid population under a
managed care plan impossible. 6
B. Base Physician Compensation on Patient Satisfaction and
Efficiency of Care
A second option is for hospitals to link physician payments to
efficiency as opposed to the cost of care. 7  Under this option,
physicians who achieved not only cost-savings with respect to the
care provided, but also sustained appropriate care outcomes would
be rewarded with incentive payments. Conceivably, these types of
incentive programs would encourage physicians to become more
efficient in their testing and treatment decisions and the way they
conduct their patient interviews and examinations.
Because only physicians with direct, patient-care duties are
banned from gainsharing incentive payments,258 hospitals could focus
their gainsharing programs on administrative staff or physicians with
no patient contact or control of services rendered2 9 For example,
administrative staff may be successful in cutting costs by setting limits
on the length of a patient's stay or the number of procedures that
doctors can order, or by suggesting the use of certain protocols for
specific procedures. 2 °  Hospitals, however, must ensure that,
although the administration would be paid based on their ability to
control departmental costs, the payments could not be characterized
as a direct or indirect incentive to reduce patient services. 6 a
To ensure that quality of care is not sacrificed for efficiency,
hospitals could implement increased performance measures such as
255. See Raymond Hernandez, Some HMO's Pulling Away on Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 1997, at BI (describing the losses by HMOs providing care to Medicaid recipients).
256. See generally Peter T. Kilborn, Largest H.M.O.s Cutting the Poor and the Elderly,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1998, at Al (noting that the losses suffered by HMOs are not
appealing to hospitals).
257. Homchick, supra note 5, at 16.
258. See Fischer, supra note 50, at 5-6.
259. Hospital administration may be able to reduce costs by purchasing in bulk or
establishing a Shared Service Organization or a Group Purchasing Organization. See
McDowell, supra note 37, at 745-46. Both the HHS and the American Hospital
Association agree that these business practices do not warrant prosecution. See id. The
Department of Justice, however, has refused HHS's request to state affirmatively that
these activities would not be prosecuted. Id. at 746.
260. Hall, supra note 80, at 453.
261. See id.
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customer satisfaction surveys to serve as checks for quality control. 62
Patient surveys could be used to determine whether patients received
appropriate care and how and when they received that care. 63 The
OIG, however, has concluded that, due to cost constraints and the
resources and time required to verify audits and arrangements, this
cost-saving option is simply not viable.26
To date, the OIG has been unwilling to accept any of the
proposed quality measures.265  The OIG's overriding rationale for
rejecting the proposed arrangements was a lack of evidence that
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiary care would not be compromised.
Patient surveys provide no assurance that physicians, in an effort to
save costs, will not be influenced into reducing or limiting "items or
services" provided to their patients.
66
Despite the OIG's express position, hospital administrators and
attorneys argue that the OIG erred in equating reductions in costs
with reductions in care. 67 Whereas the CMP statute does not
specifically prohibit payments that serve as incentives to reduce
unnecessary costs, some providers may seek a court declaration that
the practice is permissible.162 In fact, the Special Advisory Bulletin
implies that some cost-saving measures that do not affect the quality
262. See Homchick, supra note 5, at 16. Moreover, arrangements based solely on
patient satisfaction and quality of services provided may be deemed acceptable because
they are not focused on procedures. Id. Hence, there would be no incentive for
physicians to reduce care. Further, quality of care, arguably the OIG's foremost concern,
would be the driving factor. See generally Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at
37,985-86 (observing that the initial prohibition of physician incentive arrangements was
prompted by the possibility of a diminution in the quality of care).
263. See generally Homchick, supra note 5, at 16 (discussing the possibility of
customized surveys).
264. See Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at 37,987.
265. The reasons for not accepting these proposals included: (1) they "were more or
less subjective," (2) they "[w]ould be applied to patient volumes that were insufficient to
yield statistically significant results," and (3) they "were not subject to independent
verification under the various gainsharing proposals." Thornton & McAnaney, supra note
205.
266. Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at 37,986. According to the OIG
Bulletin, the "plain language" of section 1128A(b)(1) of the Social Security Act "prohibits
tying the physicians' compensation for such services to reductions or limitations in items
or services provided to patients under the physicians' clinical care." Id. This
interpretation implies that the Act prohibits the use of formulas for such things as drugs
and incentives to purchase the most 'cost-effective' piece of medical equipment. Id.
267. Homchick, supra note 5, at 14-15; see generally Health Care-Physician Incentives:
Law Firm Organizes Health Industry Group, Seeks Reversal of OIG's Gainsharing
Bulletin, 68 U.S.L.W. 2100, 2100 (Aug. 24, 1999) (noting that a "coalition of health
industry players" is being formed to contest the OIG's finding that gainsharing programs
violate CMPs).
268. Jaklevic, supra note 17, at 12.
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of patient care, including "substituting lower cost but equally
effective medical supplies, items or devices; re-engineering hospital
surgical and medical procedures; reducing utilization of medically
unnecessary ancillary services; and reducing unnecessary lengths of
stay" are permissible.
269
A second alternative for increasing efficiency is to combine
Medicare Part A and Part B payments, thus systematically aligning
the financial interests of physicians and hospitals.27 The HCFA has
already identified several sites for such a demonstration.2 71 The
combination of Medicare Part A and Part B payments would
drastically alter the entire PPS-no longer would physicians be paid
based on each service rendered; rather, they too would be paid based
on the patient's diagnosis.272 This payment scheme would also allow
for a redistribution of Medicare dollars between hospitals and
physicians-each would receive a proportion of the pre-determined
Medicare payment.273 Undoubtedly, it would result in concerns about
the relationship between physician compensation and financial
performance-society would have to be willing to accept physicians
providing fewer services and tests in exchange for increased
efficiency.2
74
A third alternative for increasing efficiency while maintaining
quality care is to cap the amount of incentive payments a physician
can receive. Capping incentives would alleviate some fears that
physicians will reduce care and services to an extreme level in order
to reap a greater share of the profits.2 75 By limiting the maximum
amount of compensation any one physician can receive, incentive
compensation caps reduce the incentive to withhold medically
necessary care. Further, national quality care benchmarks, such as
269. Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at 37,986.
270. See Align Docs', Hospitals' Money Incentives, supra note 53, at 66; see also supra
note 46 (explaining Medicare Parts A and B).
271. Align Docs', Hospitals' Money Incentives, supra note 53, at 66.
272. Id. Comparatively, if gainsharing arrangements were deemed permissible, no
changes to the PPS would be necessary because hospitals would have the cost-saving
device-incentive plans-they need to create greater efficiencies and save money. Id.
273. Id. at 50, 66.
274. See id. at 66 (explaining that society and the industry would then be forced to
decide what it wanted and what it was willing to allow).
275. Id. Included among the quality of care goals is assurance that beneficiaries are
not receiving a diminution in medically necessary care, making sure that individuals are
not released from the hospital prematurely, and that there are no improper admissions.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
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patient surveys, could also be implemented to ensure that the OIG's
quality standards are being maintained. 6
Those most familiar with the PPS and the challenges it presents
to hospitals recognized that there must be some permissible means to
align the economic interests of hospitals and physicians.2" The
developers of the PPS have suggested two ways that the industry and
government could work together to loosen the legal noose of current
federal regulations and the recent OIG Special Advisory Bulletin.
The first proposal focuses on neutralizing disincentives to
performance.278 The second focuses on creating performance-based
incentives. 279
Neutralizing disincentives to performance may be achieved
through the use of a singular payment to the attending physician or
the hospital for all of the professional services related to the
admission of the beneficiary."0 DRGs are an example of this type of
singular payment scheme. This approach is considered "risk-free"
because it is not profit oriented21 and can serve as an incentive for
enhanced operational improvements without rewarding physicians
for withholding services to patients.m The second proposal, creating
performance based incentives, mirrors the previous
recommendations and suggests that physicians be compensated based
on their overall performance, including quality of care as perceived
by the patient. s3 Both of the proposals offer new ways for hospitals
to achieve cost-savings through physician compensation without
implementing a gainsharing arrangement.
D. 1986 Recommendations
With so much ambiguity over the future treatment of
gainsharing arrangements by regulatory agencies, in 1986 the General
Accounting Office (GAO) to the Subcommittee on Health,
276. Align Docs, Hospitals' Money Incentives, supra note 53, at 66.
277. Id. at 50, 66.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 50.
280. Id.
281. Id. (noting that this is feasible based on the "development of severity-adjusted
DRG-based patient classifications"). This would allow payments for physician services
and the elimination of under-compensation to those physicians who treat sicker patients.
Id.
282. Id. This approach would eliminate the appearance of "bonuses" often negatively
associated with gainsharing arrangements. Id.
283. Patient satisfaction levels can be determined through the use of surveys. See supra
notes 87-90 and accompanying text (noting the use of surveys).
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Committee of Ways and Means issued recommendations as to the
suggested treatment of physician incentive plans.' The GAO report
recommended that new regulations be enacted to allow incentive
plans if the hospital's decision to pay a physician is based on the cost
performances of a group of physicians and not on the individual
performance of a given physician over the course of a year? 8  The
report further suggested that incentive plans be required to have
detailed instructions and requirements for utilization and quality
review. 6  In addition, the report recommended a mandate
prohibiting physician incentive plans based on the physician's cost
performance. 2 7
These recommendations provide guidance as to the direction the
government might take concerning gainsharing arrangements.
Hospitals may implement these costly and time consuming changes
based on these recommendations, but may still face harsh penalties
for noncompliance with federal law. The recommendations also
serve as a starting place for new legislation governing physician
incentive programs.
E. Legislation
Federal legislation is perhaps the most effective means by which
hospitals can gain assurance as to the permissibility of gainsharing
arrangements because legislation would provide the requisite legal
foundation to legitimize gainsharing arrangements. 8  The OIG
Bulletin stated that, absent a legislative or regulatory change
permitting some kind of gainsharing or incentive-based program
between physicians and hospitals, the OIG could not ignore its
mandate to strictly enforce federal regulatory prohibitions of such
arrangements. 2 9 Coalitions are already forming on behalf of the
284. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
285. Id. at 4.
286. Id. at 24.
287. Id. at 17-18. The GAO Report observed that although some incentive
arrangements call for quality review and separate incentive payment pools based on
patient satisfaction, these features are likely to be ineffective. Id. Measuring patient
satisfaction is an extremely difficult task and one that demands prompt response,
something rarely seen in the health care industry. Id. at 18.
288. See Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 18, at 37,985 (stating that "regulatory
relief from CMP prohibition will require statutory authorization").
289. Id. The OIG noted that there are some circumstances and arrangements in which
appropriately structured gainsharing programs may offer beneficial results for hospitals
and physicians while not detracting from the quality of care a patient receives. Id. In the
Special Advisory Bulletin, the OIG acknowledged that savings generated by substituting
lower-priced, equally effective products; re-engineering surgical and medical procedures;
200]
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hospital industry to promote legislative change.2 90 The coalitions'
primary goal is to amend the Social Security Act "by introducing
legislation that would prohibit only payments that encourage doctors
to limit 'medically necessary' care. '"291 Although the coalitions are
working for change, the timing and makeup of any proposed
legislation remains unresolved.2' Similarly, Congress must also enact
legislation providing safe harbors that account for the possible
benefits of gainsharing.2 93 These safe harbors should allow flexibility
and account for the rapidly changing and extremely complex nature
of modem health care.
In addition to amending the Social Security Act to permit
gainsharing arrangements, legislation amending the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997 is also needed. 94 Congress can ease the financial
pressure faced by hospitals by relaxing some of the amendment's
provisions that reduce Medicare reimbursement to hospitals.
Legislation addressing this issue has already been introduced in
Congress.295 For example, the proposed296 Medicare Common Sense
Hospital Payment Act297 and Triple-A Rural Health Improvement
Act29 would provide exemptions and relief for those facilities
and reducing unnecessary utilization and inpatient stays would not affect patient care, but
would still violate section 1128A(b)(1) of the Social Security Act. Id. at 37,986.
290. Health Care-Physician Incentives: Law Firm Organizes Health Industry Group,
Seeks Reversal of OIG's Gainsharing Bulletin, 68 U.S.L.W. 2100,2100 (Aug. 24, 1999).
291. Mary Chris Jaklevic, Gain-Sharing OK in Managed Care, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Sept. 6, 1999, at 24,24.
292. Id. The OIG admits that the process of amending the Social Security Act and
granting the agency the necessary authority to develop comprehensive rules would take
years. Jaklevic, supra note 12, at 12.
293. With additional safe harbors, gainsharing arrangements could achieve greater
innovation and efficiency. See James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an
Evolving Health Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. &
MED. 205,220-21 (1996).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65 (explaining the impact of the Balanced
Budget Amendment on the hospital industry).
295. See Jonathan Gardner, Relief Gestures Fail to Charm Providers, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, July 12, 1999, at 8,8.
296. Jonathan Gardner, Congress to Consider Budget-Law Relief Bills, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, June 7, 1999, at 10, 10. The bill carves out "disproportionate share
payments from Medicare+Choice capitation rates and pays them directly to hospitals." Id.
297. Medicare Common Sense Hospital Payment Act, H.R. 405, 106th Cong. (1999).
Introduced by Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Representative Jim Nussle (R-
Iowa), the bill would repeal measures that reduce certain hospital payments for patients
discharged to post-acute providers. Gardner, supra note 296, at 10.
298. The Triple-A Rural Health Improvement Act, H.R. 1344, 106th Cong. (1999).
Introduced by Rep. Jim Nussle (R-Iowa), the bill places a "floor on Medicare outpatient
department payments for rural hospitals." Gardner, supra note 296, at 10. Exemptions
from the requirements of federal laws are among the relief measures sought. See H.R.
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operating in historically impoverished or rural areas that struggle to
maintain adequate physician coverage.
F. Advisory Opinions
In the absence of legislation, hospitals have resorted to soliciting
advisory opinions from various agencies for guidance in establishing
viable gainsharing arrangements. The OIG Bulletin implied,
however, that there was little future advisory opinions could offer
because the CMP statute is clear as to what constitutes permissible
arrangements. 29 9 Nonetheless, several requests for advisory opinions
are pending with the HCFA and the OIG seeking further guidance
on how to tailor gainsharing arrangements to comply with the
applicable rules and regulations."° Ideally, the industry would like an
opinion stating that compliance with the CMP statute is sufficient to
comply with the anti-kickback and Stark anti-referral laws. °1
The HCFA and the OIG, however, have been reluctant to
provide individual advisory opinions. ° One reason for the delay is
the OIG's fear that a favorable advisory opinion may confer a
competitive advantage to a particular institution. 0 3 Moreover, if
individual advisory opinions are issued, other hospitals may elect to
forgo the process, and construct arrangements based on previous
opinions, in hopes the arrangement is similar enough to be protected
1344.
299. Washlick, supra note 1, at 7; see also OIG Issues Bulletin, supra note 18
(explaining the Special Advisory Opinion). The press release accompanying the OIG
Bulletin stated that "[a]fter consulting with experts inside and outside the federal
government and reviewing the legislative history of the prohibition on hospital payments
to physicians to reduce or limit care, [the OIG had] determined that gainsharing
arrangements raise significant issues that cannot be resolved through the advisory opinion
process." Id.
300. See Telephone Interview with Robert Homchick, supra note 15. Any opinions
that are released, however, will likely come from the OIG. To date, the HCFA has issued
only two opinions, both related to the Stark anti-referral laws. Id. Further, where the
HCFA will come out on this issue is not entirely clear. Id.
301. See generally Fischer, supra note 50, at 7 (noting what may and may not qualify as
sufficient for compliance). Homchick and King also note that such an opinion is
something the industry would like to see; however, neither anticipates its arrival anytime
soon. Telephone Interview with Robert Homchick, supra note 15; Telephone Interview
with Marilou King, supra note 10.
302. The OIG recognizes the potential for hospitals to persuade high-referring
physicians to stay with them by manipulating accounts to evidence savings, thereby leading
the physician to think she would be recovering more. See Special Advisory Bulletin, supra
note 18, at 37,987. Further, advisory opinions do not offer the oversight that the
government deems necessary to prevent deterioration of quality and increases in fraud.
Id.
303. Id.
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from sanctions."° Finally, published advisory opinions may lead to a
rash of requests for more advisory opinions-something the OIG is
simply not equipped or willing to handle. 0 5 The individual hospitals
ultimately will have to comb through the possible solutions to
determine the best course of action.
CONCLUSION
Congress misaligned the incentives of physicians and hospitals
when it created the PPS and the method by which physicians are
reimbursed for services rendered to Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries.3" The creators of the Medicare DRG prototype insist
that arrangements that align the differing incentives of hospitals and
physicians are necessary for the current reimbursement system to be
effective. 7
Gainsharing is an effective way to achieve this goal. Gainsharing
is an essential means to curtail the "incentives toward ever-increasing
health care costs" while at the same time offering a means to
expedite "individuation of patient care and physician autonomy. 
' 308
The recent Special Advisory Bulletin effectively prohibits all
gainsharing arrangements that influence the way physicians treat
their patients. The Bulletin and the applicable regulations, however,
ignore the benefits of the arrangements including increased
productivity and decreased costs. It further ignores most hospitals'
efforts to construct the arrangements that ensure that quality of care
is maintained.
304. See id. Advisory opinions rendered are binding on the HHS (OIG) and the
requesting party. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7d(b)(4)(A) (West Supp. 2000). This may play a
role in the OIG's hesitation to render opinions.
305. The OIG stated that the commonalties in requests lend themselves to Special
Advisory Bulletins versus individualized advisory opinions. See Special Advisory Bulletin,
supra note 18, at 37,987. Further, the OIG stated that case-by-case determinations with
advisory opinions are inadequate and inequitable. Id. Time and cost also serve as
formidable deterrents. Id.
306. See Telephone Interview with Robert Homchick, supra note 15.
307. Align Docs', Hospitals' Money Incentives, supra note 53, at 50; see also U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT FOR MEDICARE:
REPORT TO CONGRESS 17 (1982), reprinted in [Extra Edition No. 374] Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH) (Jan. 5, 1983). The Secretary of Health and Human Services'
Report to Congress, which prompted the passage of the DRG legislation, stated that "the
ability of a hospital to respond to prospective payment incentives depends on the ability of
the hospital administrator to transmit these incentives to the attending physician staff."
Id.
308. Orentlicher, supra note 25, at 191.
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The government apparently desires to reduce health care costs
and help patients, yet it continues to thwart the industry's efforts to
achieve these same goals. Changes allowing gainsharing would help
achieve the same money saving and quality care goals that both
hospitals and the government share. Unless legislation is passed or
further advisory opinions are generated, it appears this attempt to
control escalating health care costs will have to be abandoned.
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